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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Class action named plaintiffs and their lawyers inhabit a unique 
position in U.S. jurisprudence.  Authorized by federal and state rules to 
advocate on behalf of thousands, sometimes millions, of unidentified 
class members, they have the potential to wield considerable power and 
influence over named defendants as well as non-party corporations in a 
particular industry who choose to alter their behavior rather than face a 
similar lawsuit.  The inherent power of the class action and its potential 
to provide broad-base relief to large numbers of persons influences the 
attitudes and behavior of plaintiffs’ lawyers and named plaintiffs alike, 
creating a dynamic between the two far different than what is seen in 
typical individual cases. 
Although class action lawsuits have been the subject of much 
scholarly research, the vast majority of that work has focused on the 
history and procedural aspects of class actions, narratives of particular 
cases, and debates surrounding their utility, cost, and the compensation 
of the lawyers who litigate them.1  Little scholarly attention, however, 
 
 1. See, e.g., STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN 
CLASS ACTION (1987); DEBRA R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC 
GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN (2000) [hereinafter HENSLER, CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS]; John C. 
Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability:  Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative 
Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370 (2000); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The 
Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and 
Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1991); Allan Erbsen, From “Predominance” 
to “Resolvability”: A New Approach  to Regulating Class Actions, 50 VAND. L. REV. 995 (2005); 
John Kilwein, Still Trying: Cause Lawyering for the Poor and Disadvantaged in Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITIES 181 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998); Scott Barclay & Anna-Maria 
Marshall, Supporting a Cause, Developing a Movement, and Consolidating a Practice: Cause 
Lawyers and Sexual Orientation Litigation in Vermont, in THE WORLDS CAUSE LAWYERS MAKE:  
2
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has been paid to the comparative expectations and attitudes of lawyers 
and clients who actually participate in class actions.2  And while the 
study of client and lawyer attitudes toward the litigation of individual 
disputes has been extensively analyzed, scant attention has been directed 
to the applicability of this voluminous research to class actions. 
This article begins to fill these significant voids.  Through a series 
of semi-structured interviews, it examines the expectations and attitudes 
of plaintiffs’ lawyers and named plaintiffs in consumer protection class 
actions:  why they filed the lawsuit, and whether their goals changed 
over time; the reasons for their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the 
result in the case; and—regardless of the result—whether they felt that 
the litigation process itself was fair.  The results of these interviews are 
then analyzed in order to determine whether they comport with two 
theories central to studies of the litigation process:  dispute 
transformation and procedural justice.  More specifically, this article 
analyzes the degree to which consumer class action plaintiffs’ lawyers 
engage in the same kind of dispute transformation with representative 
plaintiffs that is well-documented in the literature involving individual 
litigants.  It also investigates whether named plaintiffs (and the lawyers 
who represent them) exhibit the same attitudes toward process fairness 
that is well documented in the procedural justice literature pertaining to 
individual disputants.  Moreover, given the politically progressive nature 
of much consumer protection litigation, this article examines the 
attitudes of class action participants through the frame of the cause 
lawyering literature.  While the study focused on the participants in 
consumer class actions, many of its conclusions can be generalized to 
class actions more generally. 
This study’s findings include the following: 
• An intriguing twist on the doctrine of dispute 
transformation.  The typical model of such transformation, 
applied to disputes between individual parties, sees lawyers 
 
STRUCTURE AND AGENCY IN LEGAL PRACTICE 171 (Austin Sarat& Stuart Scheingold eds., 2005) 
[hereinafter THE WORLDS CAUSE LAWYERS MAKE]. 
 2. One notable exception to this lacuna is Bryant Garth’s excellent 1992 study of plaintiffs’ 
lawyers and named plaintiffs in thirty-seven class actions closed in the Northern District of 
California from 1979 to 1984.  See Bryant Garth, Power and Legal Artifice: The Federal Class 
Action, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 237 (1992) [hereinafter Garth, Power and Legal Artifice].  Garth’s 
rich study focused on seven case studies of different types of federal class actions (antitrust, 
government benefits, and employment discrimination) to explore the extent to which named 
plaintiffs are empowered by their experience.  The current study focuses on consumer protection 
class actions and is more concerned with the comparative attitudes of plaintiffs’ lawyers and named 
plaintiffs toward their particular case and the class action process generally. 
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deflating the unrealistic expectations of their clients, 
minimizing them to the limited form of relief the legal 
system can deliver (usually monetary damages).3  In 
contrast, as this article demonstrates, consumer class action 
lawyers often deliberately inflate the expectations of their 
clients, encouraging them to look beyond individual 
monetary compensation and focus instead on relief for the 
entire class, which sometimes includes non-monetary 
awards.  In this way, class action lawyers do more than 
merely manage their client’s expectations, a well-
documented process in individual litigation.  Instead, they 
consciously urge their clients to expand those expectations.  
If their clients refuse to be so encouraged, the lawyers opt 
not to include them as named plaintiffs. 
• Named plaintiffs bring a broad and complex array of 
motivations and expectations to their role.  This is partly 
the result of their lawyers’ transformational efforts noted 
above.  Thus, most named plaintiffs in this study desired 
both individual and collective forms of justice, including 
monetary relief for themselves and the entire class, 
assurances that the defendant would cease its offending 
conduct, and some sense that justice had been done.  But 
many named plaintiffs are looking for more:  they hope, 
and frequently expect, that the class action to which they 
aligned themselves would demonstrate that the defendant 
was wrong and, by extension, change the behavior of actors 
throughout a particular industry.  These broad expectations 
were more ambitious than those of most of the lawyers in 
the study, whose goals centered on relief strictly available 
through the class action mechanism, i.e., monetary 
damages and injunctions directed against the particular 
defendant in the lawsuit. 
• The named plaintiffs also exhibited a wide and complex 
array of reasons for their feeling of satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction with the result of their class action.  Nearly 
all of the cases discussed in this study yielded settlements 
 
 3. William Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes:  Naming, 
Blaming, Claiming, 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631, 645-47 (1980-1981); AUSTIN SARAT & WILLIAM 
FELSTINER, DIVORCE LAWYERS AND THEIR CLIENTS 53-59 (1995).  See generally JAMES BOYD 
WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL AND LEGAL CRITICISM (1990) 
[hereinafter WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION]. 
4
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requiring monetary payouts or specific performance by the 
defendant.  While most of the named plaintiffs expressed 
satisfaction because of these concrete settlement terms, 
many also cited other reasons for satisfaction, including 
proving that the defendant was wrong and the plaintiffs 
were right, changing corporate behavior throughout the 
relevant industry, and helping non-profit organizations 
through cy pres awards.  This nearly uniform sense of 
satisfaction with the case result contrasts with the empirical 
research on individual cases, which has demonstrated that 
despite their recovery of monetary damages, many 
individual plaintiffs are nevertheless disappointed because 
their “extra-legal” goals (apologies, public accounting, and 
the like) remain unfulfilled.4  The named plaintiffs in this 
study were satisfied for a number of reasons, including the 
fulfillment of “extra-legal” goals. 
• The named plaintiffs equated fairness with result.  In 
contrast to literature on process fairness, this study reveals 
little correlation between named plaintiffs’ involvement 
with, or control over, the lawsuit and their satisfaction with 
the result and assessment of the fairness of the process.  On 
the contrary, even named plaintiffs who described a sense 
of detachment from the lawsuit nevertheless expressed 
significant personal satisfaction about the experience.  
They also tended to base their assessment of process 
fairness on the performance of their lawyers.  These 
findings contradict central aspects of the procedural justice 
and process control theories, which post that clients 
evaluate fairness and result separately, and are more 
satisfied with disputing systems that permit them greater 
control.5  I found no such correlation in this study.  Instead, 
the majority of named plaintiffs interviewed evaluated the 
fairness of the process according to the result in the case. 
 
 4. Tamara Relis, It's Not About the Money!: A Theory on Misconceptions of Plaintiffs' 
Litigation Aims, 68 U. PITT L. REV. 701, 705, 706 (2006) [hereinafter Relis, It's Not About the 
Money!];See also TAMARA RELIS, PERCEPTIONS IN LITIGATION AND MEDIATION:  LAWYERS 
DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFFS AND GENDERED PARTIES (2009)[hereinafter RELIS, PERCEPTIONS IN 
LITIGATION AND MEDIATION]. 
 5. See generally John Thibault & Laurens Walker et al., Procedural Justice as Fairness, 26 
STAN. L. REV. 1271 (1974). 
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• The named plaintiffs felt a sense of empowerment 
regardless of their level of involvement with the case.  This 
contradicts one of the core findings in Bryant Garth’s study 
of class actions nearly two decades ago.6  Among other 
things, Garth found that class actions can be empowering 
for the named plaintiff, depending on the type of case and 
the level of client involvement with the litigation.7  My data 
reveals that for named plaintiffs in consumer class actions, 
a group which Garth’s study did not examine, 
empowerment may have more to do with how clients 
perceive the lawsuit and what it hopes to accomplish than 
the client’s role within it. 
• The class action plaintiffs’ lawyers in this study conflated 
client and cause.  Much cause lawyering literature probes 
the conflict between a cause lawyers’ duties to her 
individual client and her devotion to the larger cause she 
hopes to serve through that client.8  The lawyers in this 
study effectively eliminate any such conflict by consciously 
seeking out named plaintiffs already devoted to the cause, 
or who are willing to be convinced to do so. 
• The class action lawyers were generally aware of their 
clients’ collective justice goals.  Studies of lawyers and 
clients in individual cases suggest that lawyers for both 
plaintiffs and defendants believe that their clients’ primary 
interest at the start of a lawsuit is to recover money, and 
that that goal remains constant throughout the course of the 
litigation.9  By contrast, the lawyers interviewed for this 
study frequently described their clients’ collective justice 
goals, including showing that the defendant was wrong, 
ensuring that others did not experience the same problems 
in the future, and wanting to see “justice done.”10  Indeed, 
many of the lawyers actively encouraged their clients to 
develop and maintain these goals throughout the lawsuit in 
 
 6. See supra note 2. 
 7. See Garth, Power and Legal Artifice, supra note 2, at 239, 242-43, 259. 
 8. Barclay & Marshall, supra note 1, at 196; Corey Shdaimah, Dilemmas of “Progressive” 
Lawyering:  Empowerment and Hierarchy, in THE WORLDS CAUSE LAWYERS MAKE, supra note 1, 
at 239, 241. 
 9. See generally, Relis, It's Not About the Money!, supra note 4; RELIS, PERCEPTIONS IN 
LITIGATION AND MEDIATION, supra note 4, at 33-61; SALLY ENGLE MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE AND 
GETTING EVEN (1990). 
 10. See infra notes 101 & 122 and accompanying text. 
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order to prevent them from being tempted by individual 
settlement offers that fail to compensate the rest of the 
class.  The only collective justice goal about which the 
lawyers were less aware was the desire to change corporate 
conduct throughout the relevant industry. 
 
These results highlight the unique lawyer-client dynamic in class 
actions.  They also demonstrate that while class action lawyers 
consciously shape their clients’ expectations, named plaintiffs—unlike 
individual plaintiffs—are usually willing participants in that shaping 
process.  Most embrace it, because it encourages the collective justice 
expectations and extra-legal goals that other disputing processes repress. 
The findings from this article are relevant to several different 
audiences described below. 
A. Scholars 
This article will enhance several areas of legal scholarship, 
including class actions, dispute resolution, cause lawyering, and the legal 
profession.  Much of the literature in these areas assumes the 
motivations of class action participants, often based on economic and 
other predictive models.  This study provides empirical data that both 
support and contradict many of these assumptions, and thus will sharpen 
the scholarly debate and recommendations for reforms that emanate 
from it. 
In addition, this study examines the relationship between class 
action lawyers and named plaintiffs from the perspective of the 
participants themselves, rather than through a more detached analysis of 
class action statutes, rules, procedures, pleadings and results.  And 
similarly, it provides space for named plaintiffs to articulate their 
expectations of, and reactions to, the class action process.  As such, it 
provides empirical data to both support and challenge assumptions about 
class action participants. 
B. Lawyers, Law Students, and the Professors Who Teach Them 
This article includes important lessons for practicing lawyers and 
students preparing to enter the profession, regardless of whether they 
ever litigate class actions.  For example, by reinforcing and expanding 
on earlier studies concerning the non-monetary motivations of 
individuals who utilize various dispute-resolution systems, this article 
underscores the need for lawyers and law students to ascertain their 
7
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clients’ goals and remain cognizant of them (and how they might be 
changing) throughout the course of the representation.  For while it is 
standard practice for students in law school clinics and lawyering skills 
courses (and presumably among practicing lawyers) to inquire about 
their client’s goals at the start of the representation, lawyers too often 
fail to check in with their clients during the course of the litigation to 
ascertain if those goals have changed.11  Such regular checking-in will 
make lawyers better able to monitor their clients’ expectations 
throughout the course of the class action, and to respond to client 
concerns about whether those expectations are likely to be met. 
For plaintiffs’ attorneys, regardless of whether they represent 
individuals or groups of plaintiffs, this article reinforces the empirical 
observation that plaintiffs enter disputes with an overlapping variety of 
goals and expectations.  And while this article cannot claim a cause and 
effect relationship between lawyer awareness of those various goals and 
client satisfaction with lawyers, it is certainly true that (1) most of the 
lawyers in this study knew about their clients’ diverse motivations, and 
(2) most of the named plaintiffs had a positive impression of their 
lawyers.  This study also demonstrates that the named plaintiffs’ 
evaluation of the fairness of the litigation process often depends on the 
skill and effectiveness of their attorney who, after all, is the main (and 
often sole) link between the named plaintiff(s) and that process.  For 
defendants’ attorneys, this study supports the view that “slavish 
adherence to the . . . [idea] of zealous advocacy” may not be in a 
lawyer’s self-interest, nor that of her client.12  Indeed, as several 
interviewees (both lawyers and named plaintiffs) indicated, overzealous 
defense lawyers at the deposition table or other points in the litigation 
may only make it more difficult for a case to be settled. 
Moreover, while this study demonstrates that some named plaintiffs 
equate a successful case and process fairness with financial 
compensation (the working assumption of many lawyers, according to 
past research on individual cases13), it also underscores that many named 
plaintiffs have a broader view of success and fairness, measuring them in 
terms of achieving social changes that extend beyond the defendant in 
their particular case. 
 
 11. See generally DAVID BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS:  A CLIENT-CENTERED 
APPROACH (2d ed. 2004). 
 12. See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom Tyler, Procedural Justice in Negotiation:  
Procedural Fairness, Outcome Acceptance, and Integrative Potential, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 
473, 495 (2008) [hereinafter Hollander-Blumoff & Tyler, Procedural Justice]. 
 13. See Relis, It's Not About the Money!, supra note 4. 
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Finally, the study reminds lawyers, law students, and their 
professors that lawyers exert considerable power over their clients and 
the framing of disputes that they present.  This power can be exercised 
both by commission (e.g., informing the client of legal claims and 
remedies about which they were previously ignorant) and omission (e.g., 
failing to seek remedies the client desires but cannot obtain through the 
legal system).  This power may be especially pronounced in the class 
action context, given (1) the broad scope of relief typically sought, (2) 
the named plaintiffs’ initial ignorance of such potential relief, and (3) the 
named plaintiffs’ relative lack of control over the process.  The irony 
suggested by the data in this study is that while class action lawyers 
frequently create and must sustain the named plaintiff’s desire for broad 
relief (i.e., beyond personal monetary compensation) in order for the 
case to continue (and the lawyer to earn a fee), many lawyers are 
unaware that those desires sometimes develop a life of their own, 
frequently extending beyond the contours of the legal system.  
Moreover, achieving these “extra-legal” goals is a major determinant of 
the named plaintiff’s satisfaction with the case result.  As such, it 
behooves lawyers to remain cognizant of those goals and discuss them 
with their client as the case progresses.  In addition to the goodwill that 
typically flows from effective communication between lawyer and 
client, communicating about these extra-legal goals may help both 
lawyer and client devise alternate means of achieving them (e.g., via 
publicity about the lawsuit that, in and of itself, might deter others in a 
particular industry from engaging in the same conduct as the defendant).  
Such communication has multiple benefits, for, as Shestowsky and Brett 
note, “[L]awyer-client counseling protocols that take into account 
disputants’ preferences can promote the democratic functioning of 
dispute resolution mechanisms and increase citizens’ respect for the 
legal system as a means for effectively and respectfully reducing legal 
conflict.”14  The interviews conducted for this article endorse the view 
that clients whose goals are taken into account came away with a 
positive attitude toward the dispute resolution process. 
C. Policy Makers 
This study’s findings suggest at least one reform to improve the 
class action process:  creating a standardized formula for compensating 
 
 14. Donna Shestowsky & Jeanne Brett, Disputants’ Perceptions of Dispute Resolution 
Procedures:  An Ex Ante and Ex Post Longitudinal Empirical Study, 41 CONN. L. REV. 63, 72 
(2008). 
9
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named plaintiffs for the time and money they spend fulfilling that role.  
Most named plaintiffs spend considerable time preparing for, and 
enduring, a deposition that frequently contains questions completely 
unrelated to the claims in the lawsuit.  Currently, incentive awards are 
provided on an ad hoc basis, usually ranging between $1000 and $1500 
in consumer credit class actions.15  Calculating those awards according 
to a standardized formula, such as a percentage of the total payout to 
class members, would provide the named plaintiff with a better idea of 
what to expect should she be successful. 
This article begins with a brief description of class actions and 
some of the controversy surrounding them.  It then provides a 
description of its empirical methodology and continues with a 
description of the theoretical frame within which the empirical data is 
later analyzed.  The bulk of the article is devoted to an analysis of the 
data on a number of fronts, including the goals of lawyers and named 
plaintiffs, their degree of satisfaction with the result of the lawsuit, and 
their evaluation of the fairness of the process. 
II.  BACKGROUND CONTEXT:  CLASS ACTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 
Class actions stir passions like few procedural devices in American 
law.  Supporters assert that they are the best means available to stop 
widespread corporate abuse in an age of governmental deregulation, and 
to vindicate or expand the rights of large groups of innocent and often 
lower income individuals, many of whom would otherwise be 
financially unable to assert their relatively modest claims in court.16  
Others have noted that, regardless of the outcome on the merits of a 
particular case, class actions can mobilize individuals and social 
movements in order to increase political support for a particular cause.17  
Critics decry the way they have been used to extort exorbitant 
settlements from innocent businesses and sublimate the interests of class 
 
 15. Theodore Eisenberg and Geoffrey P. Miller, Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs:  
An Empirical Study 27 (New York University Law and Economics Working Papers, Paper No. 40, 
2005), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1043&context=nyu_lewp. 
 16. NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, CONSUMER CLASS ACTIONS 3-4 (7th ed. 2010); 
HERBERT B. NEWBERG ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 5:7, § 5:19, § 5:21 (2009); See also 
Garth, Power and Legal Artifice, supra note 2; John C. Coffee Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s 
Attorney:  The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class 
and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986). 
 17. See Lynn Mather, Conclusion: The Mobilizing Potential of Class Actions, 57 IND. L. J. 
(1981-1982) (discussing the role court cases have played in social movements); MICHAEL 
MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK:  PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION 
79 (1994). 
10
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members to those of greedy plaintiffs’ lawyers who are only interested 
in obtaining hefty attorney’s fee awards, sometimes by settling early.18  
Other critics maintain that class actions frequently fail to solve the 
targeted problems, while alienating the plaintiffs and limiting social 
change opportunities by diverting energy and resources from more 
effective and client-centered advocacy efforts.19  Still others observe that 
since the 1970’s the class action has been transformed from a sword for 
justice to a shield for defendants, permitting them to cap liability and 
appear as responsible corporate actors.20 
U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts recently noted that 
class actions are “a dramatic departure from the normal rules of 
litigation,” and intimated that their main purpose is to provide leverage 
to the plaintiff in settlement negotiations.21  Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals Judge Richard Posner has noted that the certification of a class 
of plaintiffs can force “defendants to stake their companies on the 
outcome of a single jury trial, or be forced by fear of the risk of 
bankruptcy to settle even if they have no legal liability.”22  And in an 
attitude reflected in the responses of many of the plaintiffs’ lawyers 
included in this study, one defense attorney has explained that the 
problem with class actions is not in the process itself, but with the judges 
who administer them: 
A class action lawsuit is much like a game of Russian roulette.  It 
depends almost entirely on the philosophy of the judge trying the 
lawsuit.  If he thinks class action suits serve a useful social purpose, 
then he will find grounds for continuing the action.  If, on the other 
hand, he thinks the particular case deals with a nit-picking problem of 
no social consequence, and if he joins that with a view that class action 
lawsuits unnecessarily clog court calendars, then he will probably 
dismiss the action.23 
 
 18. Walter Dellinger, The Class Action Fairness Act:  Curbing Unfairness and Restoring 
Faith in our Judicial System, Progressive Policy Institute Policy Report 3-4 (2003); HENSLER, 
CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS, supra note 1, at 4. 
 19. See generally, GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE (2008) (arguing that using 
the courts as a means to bring social change has not been very effective); Derrick Bell, Serving Two 
Masters: Integration Ideals and Clients Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L. J. 
470 (1976); William Simon, Visions of Practice In Legal Thought,  36 STAN. L. REV. 469, 481 
(1984). 
 20. Natalie C. Scott, Don’t Forget Me!  The Client in a Class Action Lawsuit, 15 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 561, 565 (2002). 
 21. Adam Liptak, Appellate Argument:  An Artist’s View, N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 2008, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/22/us/22bar.html. 
 22. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J.). 
 23. HENSLER, CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS, supra note 1, at 16. 
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These critiques are top-down observations of the class action 
process as a social phenomenon that, depending on the perspective of the 
observer, is either an inspired, misguided, or counterproductive vehicle 
for social change.  One assumes that this debate will continue to rage, 
leading to ever more tinkering with the procedures that govern class 
actions.  But what do we know of how the participants view this 
procedural device and what role should those views have in the debate 
going forward?  Moreover, what can those views teach us about the 
complementary and contradictory ways in which class action lawyers 
and their clients view not only the class action mechanism but the legal 
system generally?  And finally, how might lawyers use their awareness 
of named plaintiffs’ attitudes to become more effective and ethical 
advocates?  This article seeks to answer these questions. 
III.  RESEARCH METHOD 
As noted above, the purpose of this study is to examine the 
motivations and expectations that plaintiffs’ lawyers and named 
plaintiffs bring to their involvement in consumer class action lawsuits.  It 
also seeks to shed light on how the parties to class action suits manage 
their motivations and expectations through the course of often protracted 
cases.  The research takes a qualitative approach, i.e., it seeks to 
understand the motivations and expectations of lawyers and clients in 
class action suits from their own points of view, and in their full 
complexity rather than in their distributional frequency.  The methods 
were therefore inductive and consisted of semi-structured interviews 
with open-ended questions that focus on a set of key themes:  why the 
interviewee became involved in the class action suit, whether initial 
motivations for becoming involved remained constant or changed during 
the course of the suit, the interviewee’s level of satisfaction with the 
result of the case, and the interviewee’s evaluation of the fairness of the 
litigation process.  The interview questions for attorneys and 
representative plaintiffs are attached as Appendix A and Appendix B, 
respectively. 
This methodology serves the objective of the research to capture 
the particularities of different cases and to identify the key themes they 
share.  Because the study examines the key motivations and expectations 
that lawyers and clients bring to class action suits, the interview of 
thirty-three lawyers and twenty named plaintiffs is sufficient to reach 
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thematic saturation:  the point at which no new themes emerge.24  The 
interviews for this study took place between April 2008 and December 
2009.25  Interviews were conducted by me, as well as staff and students 
at the University of Minnesota Center for Survey Research, the 
University of Wisconsin Survey Center, the University of Minnesota 
Law School, and the University of Wisconsin Law School.  Interviews 
were conducted either in person or via telephone.  All interviews were 
audio taped.26  Interviewees were guaranteed confidentiality as to all 
potentially identifying information, including the names of parties, 
attorneys, cases, judges, and courts. 
The lawyers interviewed for the study specialize in litigating 
consumer class actions.  Most were selected from the publicly available 
membership listing of the National Association of Consumer Advocates, 
a nationwide membership and advocacy organization of over 1500 
attorneys27.  NACA’s website states that “[a]s an organization fully 
committed to promoting justice for consumers, NACA's members and 
their clients are actively engaged in promoting a fair and open 
marketplace that forcefully protects the rights of consumers, particularly 
those of modest means.”28  The lawyers interviewed work in a total of 
seventeen states, from every major region of the country, with no more 
than four attorneys from any one state.  Prior to each of these interviews, 
the lawyers were asked to identify a closed (no longer pending) class 
action lawsuit which they had litigated that would be the subject of most 
of the questions during the course of the interview.  They were also 
asked to provide contact information for one or more of the named 
plaintiffs from that particular lawsuit.  In many cases, the lawyer made 
the initial contact with the client in order to determine whether the client 
 
 24. Greg Guest et al., How Many Interviews Are Enough?:  An Experiment with Data 
Saturation and Variability, 18 FIELD METHODS 59, 64-65 (2006); Michael W. Firmin, Themes, in 
THE SAGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 868 (Michael S. Lewis-Beck et al. eds., 
2004).  Because the goal of this research was to describe shared perceptions among two relatively 
homogenous groups (i.e., named plaintiffs in consumer class actions and their lawyers), this sample 
size was sufficient to achieve thematic saturation.  See Guest et al., supra, at 76 (“If the goal is to 
describe a shared perception, belief, or behavior among a relatively homogeneous group, then a 
sample of twelve will likely be sufficient.”). 
 25. Seven interviews of lawyers, which were part of a pilot study, were conducted in the 
spring of 2008.  The pilot study consisted of email surveys followed by telephone interviews. 
 26. Interview tapes are on file with the author. 
 27. National Association of Consumer Advocates, http://www.naca.net/.  (Last visited Mar. 
14, 2010). 
 28. Id. 
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would be willing to participate in an interview about the class action.29  
This contact usually facilitated client willingness to participate in the 
study. 
I focused on consumer class actions for a number of reasons.  First, 
consumer law cases are a discrete, but not insignificant category of class 
action litigation in the United States.  In 2006 and 2007, the most recent 
years for which data is available, consumer law cases (which include 
misrepresentation, fraud, failure to make required disclosures, and 
abusive debt collection practices) comprised 19% and 18%, respectively, 
of all federal court class action settlements across the country.30  The 
only category of cases with a larger percentage of settlements during 
those years was securities law, at 40% and 35%, respectively.31  Second, 
consumer class actions almost always involve individual named 
plaintiffs, as opposed to securities class actions, where the named 
plaintiff is often a financial institution.32  Third, the individual named 
plaintiffs in consumer class actions typically have direct knowledge of, 
and interest in, the subject matter of the lawsuit, which may not be the 
case in other, more complicated class actions involving issues such as 
securities and antitrust law.  And finally, because consumer class actions 
frequently seek both monetary and injunctive relief, they hold the 
potential for conflict between attorneys and clients over motivations for 
filing and continuing to litigate the lawsuit.33 
At first glance, this study’s empirical focus on consumer class 
actions suggests that its conclusions are limited to the consumer law 
context.  For example, less money is typically at stake in consumer class 
actions than in other types of class actions, particularly securities class 
actions.34  Moreover, the named plaintiffs in consumer class actions have 
 
 29. See, e.g., Telephone Interview 30044 (Dec. 1, 2009); Telephone Interview 30034 (Sept. 
25, 2009). 
 30. Brian Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee Awards, 
107 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2010), available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1442108, at 10. (CELS 2009 4th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal 
Studies Paper; Vanderbilt Public Law Research Paper No. 10-10; Vanderbilt Law and Economics 
Research Paper No. 10-06.)  In his Study, Fitzpatrick provides data for class actions under two 
separate categories of “consumer” (in which he includes cases brought under the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act and consumer fraud) and “debt collection” (cases brought under the Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act).  I have combined his statistical findings under the general rubric of 
consumer law cases for purposes of their relevance to this article. 
 31. Id. 
 32. James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Does the Plaintiff Matter?  An Empirical Analysis of 
Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1616 (2006). 
 33. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 30, at 15. 
 34. In 2006 and 2007, the last years for which data has been compiled, the total ascertainable 
value in securities class actions was over $16.7 billion and  $8 billion, respectively (the disparity 
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typically suffered relatively modest (if any) financial harm, as opposed 
to the named plaintiffs in employment, antitrust, or securities litigation.35  
And consumer class actions often seek relief that benefits society 
generally (e.g., injunctions barring similar conduct in the future), 
whereas other class actions seek only monetary recovery.36  While these 
contextual differences suggest that research on named plaintiffs in other 
types of class actions is warranted, many of this study’s conclusions 
apply to class actions generally. 
A few particulars about the lawsuits selected by the attorneys 
interviewed for this study:  approximately one half of the cases involved 
some form of misrepresentation, fraud, or breach of contract against 
mortgage companies, insurance companies, landlords and various 
product manufacturers.  The other half involved abusive debt collection 
practices, credit reporting errors, or discriminatory credit terms.  The 
class sizes ranged from less than 100 class members (a landlord/tenant 
case) to tens of millions (a product labeling case), with about one third 
of the cases under 1500.  The duration of the cases ranged from one year 
to ten years, with the bulk between two and six years. 
The methodology for this study is not without risk of bias.  First, by 
allowing the lawyers to choose the case on which they wanted to focus 
in an interview, one would expect the only cases so selected to have 
been successful in the eyes of the attorneys and, perhaps, their clients.  
Most lawyers avoid telling “war stories” about unsuccessful cases.  This 
proved to be true for most, but not quite all, of the lawyers interviewed:  
two lawyers opted to discuss proposed class actions that were never 
certified.37  This tendency to choose “successful” cases might be seen as 
biasing perceptions of fairness, given the suggestion in the distributive 
justice literature that outcomes are a major determinant of disputants’ 
views of the fairness of an adjudicative process.38 
However, by permitting attorneys to choose the case to be 
discussed, this study is actually better able to isolate and analyze 
perceptions of fairness.  Insofar as one would expect attorneys and 
clients to equate success (usually identified in terms of resource 
allocation) with procedural fairness, to the extent that interviewees 
 
between those two years is largely attributable to the settlement of litigation over the collapse of 
Enron).  For those same years, the values in federal court consumer class actions was over $525 
million and $735 million, respectively.  See Fitzpatrick, supra note 30, at 18. 
 35. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 16, at 19. 
 36. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 30, at 15. 
 37. Telephone Interview 2002 (Apr. 3, 2009); Telephone Interview 30013 (Oct. 25, 2008). 
 38. Shestowsky& Brett, supra note 14, at 90-91. 
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criticize the fairness of their class action, we will learn more about the 
ingredients of disputants’ perceptions of fairness of process.  And, sure 
enough, several interviewees have criticized the fairness of an outwardly 
“successful” class action, usually because it took too long, lacked an in-
court hearing, put the named plaintiff through an unnecessarily grueling 
and demeaning deposition, or featured a judge who did not understand 
class action procedure. 
Second, it is far easier to arrange interviews with lawyers than with 
named plaintiffs.  Given my requirement that a case selected for the 
study must be closed, many of the lawyers had not been in touch with 
their clients for a significant period of time.  Some of those clients have 
either moved or were otherwise unable or unwilling to be interviewed.  
As such, the study did not include a corresponding named plaintiff for 
each of the lawyers interviewed.  Although this prevented a direct 
comparison between lawyer and client in each case, it nevertheless 
allowed for an examination of the range of viewpoints of plaintiffs’ 
attorneys and representative plaintiffs toward the class action 
mechanism. 
Third, while in individual cases the client chooses her lawyer, in 
many class actions the opposite is generally true, at least in situations 
where the lawyer has more than one potential named plaintiff from 
which to choose before filing suit.39  As is evident from the interviews 
reviewed below, this means that many class action lawyers select as 
class representatives those plaintiffs whose goals toward the case reflect 
their own (or are willing to have their goals expanded to mirror the 
collective justice goals of their lawyer), and therefore go beyond mere 
financial reward.  As such, one might expect the field of named plaintiffs 
in this study to harbor attitudes dissimilar to individual plaintiffs, and 
more like the lawyers who select them.  This, however, was not the case.  
The main difference between the named plaintiffs in this study and 
individual plaintiffs analyzed in various studies over the years is that the 
named plaintiffs here were encouraged by their attorneys to maintain and 
even expand their non-monetary, collective justice goals throughout the 
course of the lawsuit.  Individual plaintiffs learn to suppress such extra-
legal goals because their lawyers have told them that they are 
unattainable.40 
 
 39. Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform, Qui Tam, and the Role of the Plaintiff, 60 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 171 (1997). 
 40. See Relis, It’s not about the Money!, supra note 4, at 702. 
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IV.  THEORETICAL FRAME:  DISPUTE TRANSFORMATION AND 
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 
The two components of the theoretical frame for this article are 
well known.  The extensive literature on dispute transformation 
catalogues the various contexts within which lawyers shape their 
individual clients’ expectations and goals to what is realistically 
attainable within the legal system.41  Indeed, this process involves not 
simply how lawyers frame a dispute for their clients, but which of the 
ever-expanding range of dispute-resolution mechanisms (e.g., litigation, 
mediation, arbitration, negotiation) they invoke.42 
In a recent study of litigants in medical malpractice cases, Tamara 
Relis described dispute transformation as a two-step process: 
First, notwithstanding plaintiffs’ dispute descriptions and initial 
expressed desires, lawyers condition clients on “legal system realities” 
and persuade them to aim for what they view as legally realistic.  
Attorneys then reframe litigants’ dispute experiences, feelings and 
extra-legal aims to fit into legally cognizable compartments suitable 
for processing within the legal system.43 
Thus, while aggrieved clients often present themselves to lawyers 
with extra-legal, non-monetary goals that generally fall within the rubric 
of “justice being done” (e.g., the desire for an apology, an 
acknowledgement of wrongdoing from the defendant, or an assurance 
that the same harm will not befall others), their lawyers convert such 
aims into the kind of relief that the legal system can provide:  money.  
This transformation process equates “doing justice” with recovering 
money from the defendant.44  Stewart Macaulay made a similar finding 
in his seminal study of individual consumer protection lawsuits, 
observing that the plaintiffs in such disputes will receive only the 
remedy (i.e., statutory damages) that the lawyers deems available and 
appropriate.45  This conversion process leads to disappointment with the 
legal system among many individual clients, given that their “extra-
 
 41. See Felstiner et al., supra note 3, at 648; SARAT & FELSTINER, supra note 3; WHITE, 
JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION, supra note 3.  
 42. Jeffrey H. Goldfien & Jennifer K. Robbennolt, What if the Lawyers Have Their Way?  An 
Empirical Assessment of Conflict Strategies and Attitudes toward Mediation Styles, 22 OHIO ST. J. 
ON DISP. RESOL.277 (2007) (discussing different mediation styles and how lawyers select mediators 
for their clients). 
 43. See Relis, It’s Not About the Money!, supra note 4, at 704-05. 
 44. Id. at 702. 
 45. Stuart Macaulay, Lawyers and Consumer Protection Laws, 14 LAW & SOC. REV 115, 156 
(1979). 
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legal” goals remain constant, and thus unfulfilled, throughout the course 
of a lawsuit.46  In his study of different types of class actions, Garth 
notes, “Dispute transformation in class actions, it seems, narrows the 
problem dramatically to get it before the court, and then the resulting 
settlements do not even provide much in the way of legal remedies.”47  
Despite this transforming process, Garth observes that in many contexts, 
particularly when the representative plaintiffs are actively involved 
throughout the litigation, the class action “at least permits significant 
empowering both of individuals and of the lawyers and the classes they 
represent.”48  As noted later in this article, most of the named plaintiffs 
in this study exhibited a sense of empowerment regardless of their level 
of involvement with the litigation.  This suggests that even if the class 
action lawyers in this study narrowed the plaintiffs’ problem to enable it 
to be filed in court, the broad scope of remedies achieved through 
settlement—and the many individuals to whom that relief applies—
prevented the kind of alienation and frustration that such a 
transformation process frequently instills within individual plaintiffs.49 
Procedural justice theory posits that disputants generally privilege 
the fairness of a given adjudicative procedure over monetary results.50  It 
contrasts with the theory of distributive justice, according to which 
participants assess the fairness of an adjudicative procedure by the 
distribution of rights or resources flowing from it.51  The work of John 
Thibault and Laurens Walker demonstrates that procedures matter 
profoundly to most participants because they believe that fair procedures 
produce fair outcomes.52  In a recent study of participants in a mediation 
setting, Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff and Tom Tyler found “no 
relationship between the experienced fairness of the negotiation process 
and the numerical outcome” of the dispute.53  In other words, 
participants in adjudicative processes view the fairness of the process 
employed to resolve their dispute as “separate and apart from their 
interest in achieving a favorable outcome.”54  Similarly, Donna 
Shestowsky has observed that “perceptions of how fair a procedure is 
 
 46. See FELSTINER & SARAT, supra note 3; Relis, It’s Not About the Money!, supra note 4, at 
720-22. 
 47. See Garth, Power and Legal Artifice, supra note 2, at 259. 
 48. Id. at 267 (emphasis in original). 
 49. Felstiner et al, supra note 3, at 648. 
 50. Shestowsky & Brett, supra note 14, at 68. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Thibault & Walker, supra note 5, at 1285-86. 
 53. Hollander-Blumoff & Tyler, supra note 12, at 490. 
 54. Id. at 477. 
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tend to depend as much, if not more, on process characteristics than on 
whether particular disputants ‘won’ their case or were otherwise favored 
by the outcome.”55 
The procedural justice literature has also provided valuable insight 
into why plaintiffs decide to sue.  For example, we know that plaintiffs 
often sue because of what they perceive as unfair or impersonal 
treatment.56  They “care . . . about having neutral, honest authorities who 
allow [them] to state their views and who treat them with dignity and 
respect, and when they find such processes, they use and defer to 
them.”57  They also “want to deal with people whose motives they 
trust.”58  The core tenets of the procedural justice theory are applicable 
in a variety of individual case areas, including employment law, workers 
compensation, medical malpractice, torts, and prison sentencing.59  And 
they appear to hold true for all individual plaintiffs, regardless of their 
income, race, or gender.60 
 
 55. Donna Shestowsky, Disputants’ Preferences for Court-Connected Dispute Resolution 
Procedures:  Why We Should Care and Why We Know So Little, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 
549, 574 (2008).  See also Adam Lamarello, Incorporating the Procedural Justice Model into 
Federal Sentencing Jurisprudence in the Aftermath of United States v. Booker:  Establishing United 
States Sentencing Courts, 4 NYU J. L. & LIBERTY 112 (2009). 
 56. See Robert J. Bies & Tom Tyler, The ‘Litigation Mentality’ in Organizations:  A Test of 
Alternative Psychological Explanations, 4 ORG. SCI. 352 (1993); E. Allen Lind et al., The Winding 
Road from Employee to Complainant:  Situational and Psychological Determinants of Wrongful 
Termination Claims,  45ADMIN. SCI. Q. 557 (2000); Gerald Hickson et al., Factors that Prompted 
Families to File Medical Malpractice Claims Following Perinatal Injuries, 267 JAMA 1359 
(1992); C. Vincent et al., Why do People Sue Doctors?  A Study of Patients and Relatives Taking 
Legal Action, 343 LANCET 1609 (1994); Howard Beckman et al., The Doctor-Patient Relationship 
and Malpractice.  Lessons from Plaintiff Depositions, 154 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 1365 (1994). 
 57. Susan Silbey, After Legal Consciousness, 1 ANN. REV. LAW SOC. SCI. 323, 337 (2005); 
See also Tom Tyler & Edgar Lind, A Relational Model of Authority in Groups, in ADVANCES IN 
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Mark Zanna ed., 1992); Tom Tyler, Procedural Justice, 
Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, in CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 
(Michael Tonry ed., 2003). 
 58. Hollander-Blumoff & Tyler, supra note 12, at 492. 
 59. See Bies & Tyler, supra note 56; Lind et al., supra note 56; See also Karen Roberts & 
Karen Markel, Claiming in the Name of Fairness:  Organizational Justice and the Decision to File 
for Workplace Injury Compensation, 6 J. OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH PSYCHOL. 332 (2001); Hickson 
et al., supra note 56; Vincent et al., supra note 56; Beckman, et al., supra note 56; Tom Tyler, What 
is Procedural Justice?  Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 103 (1988); Tom Tyler, The Role of Perceived Injustice in Defendants’ 
Evaluations of Their Courtroom Experience, 18 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 51 (1984); Jonathan D. Casper 
et al. Procedural Justice in Felony Cases, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 483 (1988); Relis, It’s Not About 
the Money!, supra note 4. 
 60. See Tom Tyler & Robert Boeckmann, Three Strikes and You Are Out, but Why?  The 
Psychology of Public Support for Punishing Rule Breakers, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 237 (1997); 
Edgar Lind et al., …And Justice for All:  Ethnicity, Gender, and Preferences for Dispute Resolution 
Procedures, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 269 (1994); Carol Kulik et al., Understanding Gender 
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A significant corollary to the procedural justice literature is the 
“process control” theory developed by Thibault and Walker.61  
According to this theory, disputants evaluate the fairness of a given 
procedure according to the distribution of control that it offers, and 
prefer those procedures that allow them (as opposed to third parties like 
judges and mediators) to control the development and selection of 
information that will be used to resolve the dispute.62  Thus, an 
interesting question at the intersection of the process control and dispute 
transformation theories is whether disputants’ perceptions of process 
fairness is influenced by the degree to which their underlying dispute—
and thus the information relevant to it—is shaped by their attorney, as 
opposed to a third party decision-maker.  This is a particularly intriguing 
question in the class action context, given that the interviews conducted 
for this study suggest that most named plaintiffs (and certainly class 
members) have less control over the development and selection of 
information to be used in the case than their counterparts in individual 
lawsuits. 
In one of several studies of the Victims Compensation Fund 
established after the attacks of September 11, 2001, Gillian Hadfield 
observes that procedural fairness not only plays an important role in 
individuals’ “willingness to cooperate as objects of governance” (i.e., as 
players in state-sanctioned decision-making processes), but also in 
situations where people see themselves as “agents of governance” (i.e., 
where the State provides them the opportunity to disseminate private 
information into the public domain, force accountability and prompt 
responsive change through litigation).63 In a similar vein, Elizabeth 
Boyle notes that in “highly interpenetrated” societies that lack clear 
boundaries between the state and civil society, individuals can see 
themselves as “hav[ing] an obligation to act as agents for other 
individuals and for society” generally.64  Indeed, Congress and many 
state legislatures promote the idea of agents of governance through fee-
 
Differences in Distributive and Procedural Justice, 9 SOC. JUST. RESEARCH 351 (1996); Tom Tyler 
& Yuen Huo, TRUST IN THE LAW:  ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND 
COURTS (2002). 
 61. Thibault & Walker, supra note 5, at 1286. 
 62. Shestowsky & Brett, supra note 14, at 69. 
 63. Gillian Hadfield, Framing the Choice between Cash and Courthouse: Experiences with 
the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 645, 674 (2008) (emphasis in original). 
 64. Elizabeth Boyle, Is Law the Rule? Using Political Frames to Explain Cross-National 
Variation in Legal Activity, 79 SOC. FORCES 385, 1200 (2000); see also Elizabeth Boyle, Political 
Frames and Legal Activity:  The Case of Nuclear Power in Four Countries, 32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
141 (1998). 
20
Akron Law Review, Vol. 44 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol44/iss1/3
8_MEILI_WESTERN.DOC 2/11/20119:52 AM 
2011] COLLECTIVE JUSTICE OR PERSONAL GAIN? 87 
shifting statues which create so-called “private attorney[s] general” to 
enforce consumer protection laws.65  Most of the named plaintiffs in this 
study embraced this role, seeing themselves protecting the public (or at 
least a portion of it) in addition to their individual interests.  Such cause-
oriented motivation is critical in class actions, given that the amount of 
individual recovery is typically insufficient to adequately compensate 
named plaintiffs for the time and energy required of that role. 
Relis’ recent study of medical malpractice cases reveals that many 
plaintiffs’ lawyers are unaware of these well-documented client motives.  
She has concluded, based on interviews with the various players in such 
cases that, among other things, “most plaintiffs’ lawyers felt that money 
was plaintiffs’ primary litigation aim.”66  Those lawyers either were 
ignorant of, or discounted, their clients’ non-pecuniary goals, including 
obtaining answers about what happened, acknowledgements of harm, 
apologies, defendants’ acceptance of responsibility, and retribution for 
insulting physician conduct.67  Relis also found that despite lawyers’ best 
efforts to condition their clients to accept only what the legal system has 
to offer (i.e., monetary compensation), clients retain their extra-legal 
objectives throughout the course of a dispute.68  The lawyers most likely 
remained ignorant of this consistently-held viewpoint because their 
clients stopped articulating their goals to them, and because their 
lawyers conditioned them into believing they were not attainable.69 
As the above review illustrates, the literature on dispute 
transformation and procedural justice provides extensive analysis of the 
behavior and attitudes of lawyers and litigants in individual cases.  Far 
less attention, however, has been paid to such behavior and attitudes in 
the class action context.  And as noted earlier in this article, research in 
the class action context would be of interest, and use, to a variety of 
audiences.  For while there have been recent attempts to blunt the impact 
and some of the alleged abuses of class actions, most notably through 
passage of the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), there is no sign that 
class action filings are diminishing.  Indeed, the recent ALI study 
referenced above found that much of the 46% increase in federal court 
class action activity between 2001 and 2006 was in federal question 
 
 65. Bryant Garth et al., The Institution of the Private Attorney General: Perspectives from an 
Empirical Study of Class Action Litigation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 353 (1988).  See also James D. 
Jeffries, Protection for Consumers Against Unfair and Deceptive Business, 57 MARQ. L. REV. 559 
(1974) (examining the statutes enacted in Wisconsin that promote consumer protection). 
 66. Relis, It’s Not About the Money!, supra note 4, at 718. 
 67. Id. at 702. 
 68. Id. at 735, 739. 
 69. Id. at 735, 741-42. 
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cases, and thus not attributable to the Class Action Fairness Act’s 
diversion of diversity actions from state to federal court.70  Moreover, 
many enterprising class action lawyers have responded to CAFA by 
seeking out the most plaintiff-friendly federal courts, thus replicating on 
the federal level one of the practices CAFA was intended to deter in 
state courts.71  Indeed, one of the lawyers interviewed for this study 
stated that “I think CAFA was seen as something that would not be good 
for class actions at first. But I think now it’s turning out that it’s not as 
bad as everybody first thought.”72  And only one of the lawyers 
interviewed listed CAFA (or any of its provisions) as something they 
would change about the class action process.73  Therefore, it is important 
from both a scholarly and public policy perspective to determine if what 
the literature tells us about lawyers and clients in individual cases also 
holds true in class actions.  We now turn to the data that will help answer 
this question. 
V.  FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
This section of the article is divided into the three general areas of 
inquiry that the open-ended interview questions explored:  goals, 
satisfaction with result, and evaluation of fairness.  Each such section 
analyzes the views of both the named plaintiffs and the attorneys, as well 
as the attorneys’ perceptions of their clients’ attitudes on each question. 
A. Comparative Analysis of Named Plaintiffs’ Goals 
1.  Named Plaintiffs’ Goals 
The named plaintiffs’ responses to an open-ended question about 
why they had initiated their class action reveal a series of complex and 
overlapping sets of goals.  Most named plaintiffs cited more than two 
goals.74  Their responses fell into two broad categories that I have termed 
self-interest (personal recovery of money or other benefit, which was 
mentioned by thirteen of twenty named plaintiffs) and collective justice 
 
 70. Thomas Willging et al., The Impact of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 on the 
Federal Court, The American Law Institute 3 (2008). 
 71. Terry Carter, A Step up in Class, 22 A.B.A. J. 24 (2008). 
 72. Interview 30014, in Portland, Or. (Oct. 25, 2008). 
 73. Telephone Interview 30047 (Oct. 29, 2009) (One of the questions posed to lawyers was 
“If you could change the class action procedure in any way, what, if anything would you change?”). 
 74. The average number of goals was 2.3, while the median and mode were each 2.  One 
named plaintiff articulated six different goals.  Telephone Interview 1018 (Dec. 12, 2008). 
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(goals that would benefit the class as a whole, and perhaps society 
generally, which was mentioned by seventeen named plaintiffs).  The 
self-interest goals included receiving a personal refund, a repaired 
product, or some other form of specific performance directed only to the 
named plaintiff, as opposed to the entire class. Only three of the thirteen 
named plaintiffs who articulated a self-interest goal listed that goal as 
their sole motivation for filing the class action.  Their responses were as 
follows: 
I just wanted my car fixed.75 
My goal was to get full insurance coverage.76 
The [device I had to install on my own] cost $100 to install.  I just 
wanted to get the $100 back.77 
These three named plaintiffs said nothing about helping others or 
society generally or making an example of the defendant.  They only 
wanted their money back, their claims paid, or a new vehicle.  However, 
they were atypical among the named plaintiffs in this study.  The other 
ten named plaintiffs who mentioned self-interest goals also articulated 
one or more collective justice goals.  Thus, most named plaintiffs in this 
study sought some form of justice for themselves as well as for the other 
members of the class. 
The named plaintiffs articulated several collective justice goals.  
The most common was a desire to help others affected by the 
defendant’s conduct, which was mentioned by half of the named 
plaintiffs.78  The following response is typical: 
My goal was to represent a class of people who probably didn’t lose 
that much money, but were wronged.79 
Some named plaintiffs were particularly concerned about other 
class members who were vulnerable because of age or ethnicity.  For 
example, one named plaintiff said she was motivated to serve as a class 
 
 75. Telephone Interview 30037 (Nov. 4, 2009) (class action against automobile manufacturer 
to repair a design defect involving the gas tank). 
 76. Telephone Interview 30039 (Nov. 24, 2009) (class action against insurance company for 
breach of contract over failure to pay property damage claim for damaged vehicle). 
 77. Telephone Interview 30036 (Nov. 3, 2009) (class action against appliance manufacturer 
for misrepresentation). 
 78. See, e.g., Telephone Interview 30038 (Nov. 30, 2009); Interview 30034, supra note 29; 
Telephone Interview 30028, (Apr. 21, 2009); Telephone Interview 30033 (July 24, 2009); 
Telephone Interview 30030 (Apr. 1, 2009). 
 79. Interview 30038, supra note 78 (class action against bank for excessive mortgage closing 
fees). 
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representative in a class action challenging a standard form debt 
collection letter because many recipients would not be able to 
understand the contents of the letter: 
I think I was angry at the time . . . it seemed like it [serving as a named 
plaintiff] was basically something that could help not just me but 
everyone else that was involved that maybe didn’t understand a few 
things because you have different people that come from different 
backgrounds, you know, the languages or cultures or what have you 
and maybe some really didn’t understand some of those things . . . 
until you have to sit and read and read and read.80 
The motivation to help others is an example of named plaintiffs 
assuming the role of agents of governance, seeing the class action as a 
means to call private entities to account in the way that an attorney 
general or other public official might.81  For these named plaintiffs, the 
class action is a vehicle for achieving justice for a large number of 
people affected by the same harm.  It is also the means by which a 
“wrong” can be set right.  This theme of righting wrongs appears 
consistently in the comments of the named plaintiffs, suggesting that 
they view the class action as one of the only areas where “little people” 
can take on large corporate interests. 
In a similar vein, four named plaintiffs said that they were 
motivated by a desire to stop the activity giving rise to the lawsuit in the 
first place.82  The following statement from the named plaintiff in a class 
action against a credit card company for debt collection practices is 
illustrative: 
My goals were to stop the company from doing that to people.83 
Another collective justice motivation was the desire to make a 
public statement about the defendant’s conduct, which was mentioned 
by seven named plaintiffs.84  The public statements envisioned by these 
named plaintiffs had two purposes.  The first was a public accounting; 
i.e., a statement that the defendant’s conduct was, quite simply, wrong. 
 
 80. Interview 30034, supra note 29. 
 81. See Hadfield, supra note 63, at 674. 
 82. Interview 1018, supra note 74; Interview 30028, supra note 78; Telephone Interview 
30029 (May 5, 2009); Telephone Interview 30035 (Oct. 20, 2009). 
 83. Interview 30028, supra note 78 (class action against credit card company for abusive debt 
collection practices) 
 84. Telephone Interview 1017 (Dec. 3, 2008); Interview 30029, supra note 82; Interview 
30030, supra note 78; Interview 30033, supra note 78; Interview 30034, supra note 29; Interview 
30035, supra note 82; Telephone Interview 30043 (Sept. 30, 2009). 
24
Akron Law Review, Vol. 44 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol44/iss1/3
8_MEILI_WESTERN.DOC 2/11/20119:52 AM 
2011] COLLECTIVE JUSTICE OR PERSONAL GAIN? 91 
As one named plaintiff in a class action against a company offering tax 
refund anticipation loans put it: 
I was pretty upset because at that point my kids were little—I’m a 
single parent—and that money was really needed for bills. And I was 
really upset with that. I didn’t think it was fair that they could take 
money and pay a debt. And I felt if you are going to pay my debt, my 
rent was due at that point, ‘pay that for me!’ And I was left with like 
nothing. And I just wanted to make a stand saying you can’t do that. 
You can’t take people’s money like that.85 
Another named plaintiff, this one in a lawsuit challenging a debt 
collector’s standard form dunning letter, cited a similar motivation: 
My main goal [was] to prove that you can’t mistreat people and 
basically think that you can get away with it.86 
For these named plaintiffs, the class action provided an opportunity 
to publicly air private grievances in a way that most individual lawsuits 
do not allow.  Their underlying assumption seems to be that that public 
airing will force the defendant to change its conduct, either through 
judicial intervention or public shaming.  As such, they exhibit faith in 
the legal system’s ability to bring about change, at least as it relates to 
the defendant’s conduct. 
The second purpose of these public statements of wrongdoing 
envisioned by named plaintiffs was to serve notice on other companies 
within the defendant’s industry.  For these named plaintiffs, the class 
action would compel these companies to change their behavior, as well.  
As one named plaintiff in a class action alleging misrepresentation in 
insurance rates stated: 
[My goals were to] punish the defendant involved in this kind of fraud 
and serve notice to other insurers that they should not engage in this 
practice.87 
For this and other named plaintiffs, the class action assumes a 
power beyond merely forcing a particular defendant to pay money 
damages to harmed class members.  Indeed, it is more powerful than the 
particular legal remedies available in a class action, which address only 
 
 85. Interview 30033, supra note 78 (class action against bank providing tax refund 
anticipation loans). 
 86. Interview 30034, supra note 29. 
 87. Interview 1017, supra note 84 (class action against auto insurance company for 
misrepresentations about rates). 
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the conduct of the named defendant.  For these named plaintiffs, the 
class action assumes the role of public conscience or moral compass.88 
The other most common collective justice motivations articulated 
by named plaintiffs were anger/revenge, which was mentioned by ten 
named plaintiffs,89 and obtaining information about the offending 
practice, which was mentioned by four.90  I have included these 
responses within the rubric of collective justice because the named 
plaintiffs who articulated these goals coupled them with a desire to 
benefit others in the class or society as a whole.  For example, named 
plaintiffs who sought truthful information about the defendant’s 
practices or products wanted to use that information for the public good, 
as exemplified by the named plaintiff in a class action alleging 
misrepresentation by the manufacturer of an over-the-counter cold 
remedy: 
My goals were, first of all, that the truth be known.  There were a lot of 
misrepresented facts that [the defendant] was allegedly claiming were 
facts.  I wanted the people to know that if they wanted to continue 
buying the product it’s absolutely OK with me, but I just felt it would 
be a waste of people’s money, and I wanted people to know that if 
there were unsatisfied people out there they [could] get their money 
back, which they did, so it was actually a successful goal.  So that 
worked out very, very well.  I understand the product is still being sold 
so it isn’t completely shut down, but I wanted people to know that [the 
product] didn’t work.91 
 
 88. This view of the legal system (or at least the class action mechanism) as a just arbiter 
between right and wrong contrasts with the views of  many legal services clients, who, according to 
Corey Shdaimah, view the legal system as unjust.  COREY S. SHDAIMAH, NEGOTIATING JUSTICE: 
PROGRESSIVE LAWYERING, LOW-INCOME CLIENTS, AND THE QUEST FOR SOCIAL CHANGE (2009).  
While this study did not obtain demographic data about the named plaintiffs, it is safe to say that 
most of those who participated were within the ranks of the middle class and thus more well off 
than most legal services clients.  This suggests that views of the ability of the legal system to 
achieve justice are in part determined by the socioeconomic status of the participant.  This 
discrepancy in viewpoint is also likely the result of past experiences with the legal system.  
Although this study did not inquire about any such prior experience, it was apparent from the 
interviews that most had none. 
 89. Interview 1018, supra note 74; Telephone Interview 30026 (Apr. 7, 2009), Telephone 
Interview 30027 (Apr. 13, 2009); Interview 30028, supra note 78; Interview 30029, supra note 82; 
Interview 30033; supra note 78; Interview 30034, supra note 29; Interview 30035, supra note 82; 
Interview 30039, supra note 76; Telephone Interview 30040 (Nov. 30, 2009). 
 90. Interview 1018; supra note 74; Interview 30030, supra note 78; Interview 30034, supra 
note 30; Telephone Interview 30042 (conducted Sept. 30, 2009). 
 91. Interview 30030, supra note 78 (class action against manufacturer of an over-the counter 
cold remedy). 
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The public good desired by information-seeking named plaintiffs 
came in the form of direct financial benefit (as the quote above 
indicates) or a more generalized vindication of public perceptions, as the 
following statement suggests: 
From the beginning we wanted to find out what happened, and 
determine if it was willful negligence.  I don’t know if that is a correct 
phrase [laughter].  You know, whether they were just helpless boobs or 
whether they actually had malintent.92 
Similarly, those named plaintiffs who expressed anger towards, or a 
desire for revenge against, the defendant saw the class action as a way to 
channel that anger into something that would benefit others.  Their anger 
typically resulted from a feeling that they (and other customers) were 
being disrespected.  As one named plaintiff in a class action against the 
producer of agricultural products explained: 
A lot of it was the fact that I don’t like the way the companies were 
just shoving things down our throats saying “Oh, don’t worry about it.”  
Well, then we were supposed to take it in the shorts and that’s not right 
. . . . It was like the company basically they thought we were a bunch 
of dumb hicks who like country music and who wear flannel shirts.  
That’s how they actually were dealing with us and they would actually 
talk down to us.  I think that motivated [my lawyer] and myself 
equally.93 
Another named plaintiff echoed the idea that the motivation for 
filing the class action was the dismissive way that the defendant (here, 
an insurance company) had treated its customers: 
In my opinion, just my opinion, we’re real people here and we’re not 
worth dirt.  That’s what I’m saying.  That’s what the insurance 
companies make you look out to be.  That [we’re] not worth nothing, 
‘just give them this.’  That’s what they do. I’m sorry, but I have to say 
that. 94 
This desire to avenge perceived disrespect overcame whatever 
reticence these named plaintiffs might have felt because of the small 
financial recovery at stake.  As the named plaintiff in a class action 
against a mortgage company for misrepresentation observed: 
 
 92. Interview 1018, supra note 74 (class action against an Internet service provider for 
deficient service). 
 93. Interview 30040; supra note 89. 
 94. Interview 30039, supra note 76. 
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It was made clear up front [by my attorney] that it was just a small 
amount of money and it wasn’t a lot but right afterwards I really had 
the conviction that I got screwed by, and I wasn’t sure who, but I was 
convinced.  The amount wasn’t great enough to really do anything 
with but the feeling, and this was several years later, was still there.  
These jerks screwed me so it was kind of payback.  But I knew the 
money was not, I mean, we got a little bit but that wasn’t the 
motivation.  It was more just kind of to fight back, I guess.”95 
Many named plaintiffs offered an overlapping array of goals, as 
demonstrated by the following statement by a named plaintiff in a 
lawsuit against a landlord.  She includes elements of helping others, 
stopping the offending conduct, anger, and shedding a public light on the 
problem: 
I had moved out of the [apartment] complex because they had raised 
my rent . . . . I had a friend who read about [the lawsuit] in the paper    
. . . . I had all the paperwork that pertained to me . . . so I just called the 
lawyer and said “if you want this, maybe it will help your case,” 
because I was so angry at the place. .. . I was really angry . . . . It was 
just really egregious.  So, that was my motivation, was just bring this 
out into the open, let’s see what’s happening.  The D.A. obviously 
wasn’t going to go after these guys; they are going after some other big 
landlords in the city at the moment who are doing other things like 
this, but they didn’t address [the defendant].  So, this class action 
seemed like a great idea.”96 
Another named plaintiff, who sued an Internet service provider for 
poor service, combined self interest (though she was not aware of the 
possibility for financial recovery until after she had agreed to 
participate), helping others who had been harmed, and revenge: 
I didn’t go into it with the idea of getting any money at all, but when 
the promise of money is held out to you, you don’t say no.  But I went 
into it to represent the people who had been harmed.  But I guess 
personal revenge was another aspect because of the personal agony I 
suffered.97 
In addition to illustrating the complex interconnectivity of named 
plaintiff goals, the first of these two statements is noteworthy because 
the named plaintiff initiated the idea of being a named plaintiff with the 
 
 95. Interview 30043, supra note 84. 
 96. Interview 30029, supra note 82 (class action against landlord for forcing lower income 
tenants to leave a renovated apartment building). 
 97. Interview 1018, supra note 74. 
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lawyer, which is the reverse of the more common pattern.  In most cases 
included in this study, the named plaintiffs approached the lawyer with a 
problem affecting them individually, and agreed to serve as a named 
plaintiff only after the lawyer informed them that others were suffering 
the same harm.98  Nevertheless, although the sample size is too small to 
justify a statistically accurate analysis, there was no correlation between 
the manner in which the named plaintiffs became engaged with the class 
action and his or her goals regarding the case.  Those named plaintiffs 
who only became aware of the possibility of a class action after 
consulting with an attorney were just as committed to collective justice 
goals as those who approached the lawyers with a class action in mind.  
Indeed, as we will see later in this article, most plaintiff-side class action 
attorneys prefer named plaintiffs who are unaware of the class action 
possibility until the lawyer tells them about it. 
Most of the named plaintiffs (fifteen out of twenty) stated that their 
goals remained constant throughout the course of the lawsuit.99  And 
nearly all who reported a change in goals indicated that their feelings of 
collective justice grew stronger as the case progressed: 
I think it crystallized and the more we learned the more we came to 
realize that it was more of a sacrifice.  Not a big sacrifice because we 
learned stuff.  We came to really see that we were fighting the good 
fight.  If we did get certified as a class it would mean something.  It 
became more important as it went on that we were doing the right 
thing for hopefully a lot of people.100 
The only thing that really bothered me about it and may have changed 
my goals was I was wanting the board of directors and the chief 
executive officers, the officers of the company, I was wanting them to 
have to fork up some money.  They made money. . . . I was hoping 
along with me getting financial restitution that they would lose a little 
something but in the end they didn’t.  They had the insurance that 
settled everything. . . . I was just not satisfied that they didn’t get hurt a 
little bit like we had been hurt.101 
Indeed, one consistent theme from the interviews is that many 
named plaintiffs became angrier as the case progressed.  In some cases, 
as noted above, this increased anger resulted from discovery about the 
 
 98. See, e.g., Interview 30036, supra note 77; Interview 30039, supra note 76. 
 99. See, e.g., Interview 30038, supra note 78. 
 100. Interview 30043, supra note 84. 
 101. Telephone Interview 30032 (July 28, 2009) (class action against fiduciaries of an 
employee benefit plan for breach of fiduciary duty). 
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defendant’s conduct.  In other cases, the named plaintiff’s anger was 
stoked by the conduct of the defendant—or its attorneys—during the 
litigation itself, particularly during depositions.  As the named plaintiff 
in the case against the Internet service provider described it: 
The opposing side did this grueling deposition on me which was really 
agonizing.  I mean really, they were asking me about stuff I did in 
elementary school and were obviously trying to dig up something in 
my background and either make it so unpleasant for me that I pull out 
of the case or find something that they could discredit my credibility.  
It was probably one of the worst experiences of my life . . . . I think 
they had two people in there but it was mainly just one guy, the 
Bulldog. . . . Coming out the other side I felt fine but in the middle of 
the process I was pretty upset . . . . I thought they were going to focus 
on stuff to do with the case.  But they were trying to find out all the 
roommates I’d ever had in my life and I’ve had an interesting life.  I’d 
like to find out about all his roommates.102 
The named plaintiffs’ descriptions of their goals, and the extent to 
which those goals endured or intensified through the lawsuit is 
consistent with the extensive literature on motivations for initiating 
lawsuits and other types of formal disputes.  For example, as noted 
earlier, many disputants sue because they perceive that they have been 
treated unfairly and/or impersonally.103  Indeed, one lasting impression 
from the interviews of named plaintiffs in this study is that corporations 
could save themselves hundreds of millions of dollars in damages and 
attorneys’ fees if they simply altered the tone of their dealings with their 
customers before conflicts intensify.  Moreover, many named plaintiffs 
embrace the opportunity to act as “agents of governance,” compelling 
accountability by offending companies and forcing them to change their 
conduct through litigation.104  The role of agent of governance in the 
class action setting seems to be particularly appealing to many named 
plaintiffs, permitting them to seek remedies that the legal system does 
not actually provide (i.e., compelling all members of a particular 
industry, not merely the defendant, to change their practices).  This sense 
of empowerment was evident in the responses of the following named 
plaintiffs, including one whose class action was not certified, leaving 
him to regret the lost opportunity to “be somebody”: 
 
 102. Interview 1018, supra note 74. 
 103. See Bies and Taylor, supra note 56. 
 104. See Hadfield, supra note 63, at 674. 
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When you take on a company that big . . . I guess my old motto these 
days is money talks and horse manure walks.  Yeah, I think we 
accomplished something.  And I guess, I get tired whether it’s politics 
or . . . when people don’t say anything but when you got numbers it 
does work, instead of letting them walk on you.105 
[Not having the class certified] was a big disappointment for us 
because we were psyched to really go.  It would have been in the 
newspaper.  We could have been somebody.106 
The staying power of the named plaintiffs’ goals is also consistent 
with the literature on individual cases.  As Relis notes, individual 
plaintiffs continue to harbor non-monetary goals throughout the lawsuit, 
though they do not articulate those goals to their lawyers because the 
lawyers communicate the legal system’s inability to fulfill them.107  And 
while the interviews for this study suggest a similar constancy of 
motivation (and in some cases a deepened collective justice motivation), 
there was no suggestion by any named plaintiffs that they needed to keep 
those goals under wraps.  Indeed, as we will see in the discussion of 
dispute transformation later in this article, many plaintiffs’ class action 
lawyers see it as part of their professional responsibility to encourage the 
named plaintiffs to maintain and even expand on their collective justice 
motivations as the case proceeds. 
2. Plaintiffs’ Lawyers’ Goals 
Like most of the named plaintiffs, nearly all of the lawyers 
interviewed for this study articulated a variety of motivations for filing 
the lawsuit.  Nearly all listed both obtaining monetary relief for the class 
and stopping or altering the defendant’s behavior as their goal in 
pursuing the class action.  As one lawyer put it, “Our goals were to get 
restitution for the class of the money that was seized [by a tax 
preparation company] and to stop the practice [debt collection] going 
forward.”108  The other responses articulated by more than two lawyers 
included obtaining attorneys’ fees/getting paid, which was mentioned by 
five (of thirty-three), and affecting conduct throughout the relevant 
industry, which was mentioned by two lawyers.  The following 
comments are representative of the latter goal: 
 
 105. Telephone Interview 30041 (Dec. 1, 2009) (class action manufacturer of agricultural 
product for misrepresentation). 
 106. Interview 30043, supra note 84. 
 107. See Relis, It’s Not About the Money!, supra note 4, at 735, 741-42. 
 108. Telephone Interview 30050 (Apr. 1, 2009). 
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Our goals were at best to get back 100 cents on the dollar and to 
effectively stop the practice, which was endemic in the industry.109 
I wanted to impact the biggest player in the industry and their policies 
and hopefully tangentially affect the rest of the industry overall.  I was 
secretly desirous in that case of getting a court to actually say you can’t 
charge [a particular insurance fee] if it’s not in the contract and I got it 
and that was an important thing for me.110 
Among the less frequently articulated lawyer goals was resolving 
the case as efficiently and expeditiously as possible,111 obtaining a cy 
pres award112, championing the cause of the class of plaintiffs,113 and a 
desire to “get” the defendant.114  It is striking that this range of responses 
mirrors very closely the breadth and complexity of the goals articulated 
by the named plaintiffs, from personal financial recovery (individual 
compensation for the plaintiffs, attorneys fees for the lawyers) to 
righting a wrong, to the hope that the class action will affect corporate 
behavior beyond the defendant in the case. 
Nearly all of the lawyers interviewed indicated that their goals 
remained constant throughout the course of the lawsuit.  The most 
common exception to this pattern was when injunctive relief either 
became impossible (because the business shut down) or moot (because 
the defendant voluntarily altered its practices).  In those cases, the 
lawyer’s goal shifted to monetary compensation alone. 115  In addition, 
one lawyer indicated that his desire to “get” the defendant increased as 
the case went on, while another stated that, as the case progressed, the 
objective of stopping the company’s practices became more 
 
 109. Telephone Interview 1007 (Oct. 24, 2008) (class action against debt collection practices 
by retailers). 
 110. Telephone Interview 30020 (Feb. 3, 2009) (class action against insurance company for an 
unauthorized fee).  This lawyer added, “I don’t think my client cared much about the law being 
developed that way.” She was right.  Her client’s only stated goal was “to get full insurance 
coverage.”  Interview 30039, supra note 76. 
 111. Telephone Interview 1003 (Oct. 21, 2008); Telephone Interview 1002 (Oct. 10, 2008); 
Telephone Interview 1007, supra note 109. 
 112. Interview 30020, supra note 110. 
 113. Interview 30049, supra note 132. 
 114. Interview 30012, in Portland, Or. (Oct. 24, 2008). 
 115. Interview 1008, in Portland, Or. (Oct. 24, 2008) (class action against Internet service 
provider for defective service); Telephone Interview 1016 (Nov. 26, 2008) (class action against real 
estate company for misrepresentation); Interview 30023 (Mar. 9, 2009) (class action against 
condominium developer for ordinance violations). 
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important.116  These reasons for intensification of collective justice goals 
are similar to those articulated by the named plaintiffs. 
The plaintiffs’ lawyers’ stated goals are consistent with traditional 
notions of progressive cause lawyering.  As Scheingold and Sarat note, 
“cause lawyers identify explicitly, and without apologies, with 
[objectives that transcend service to clients].”117  This observation 
assumes a distinction between service to clients and service to a larger 
cause.  Indeed, much of the cause lawyering literature assumes that there 
is a bright line between the interests of the clients and the interests of the 
cause.118  This assumption is based on the general perception that most 
clients only care about obtaining monetary compensation or other forms 
of individual relief for the harm they have suffered, while cause lawyers 
strive for some larger social good.  As one lawyer put it: 
I think that all consumer protection lawyers take themselves and their 
role in society a lot more seriously than the clients generally do.  
That’s just true.  We do.  We all consider ourselves like self-appointed 
regulators.  I don’t make apologies about it.  I think it’s a necessary 
role in society.  I think there’s nobody else doing it.  I will say that our 
clients don’t feel as strongly about that as we do.119 
However, the data from this study suggest that this supposedly clear 
distinction between client and cause becomes obscured in the consumer 
class action context.  Most of the lawyers interviewed did not recognize 
or articulate any need to transcend or ignore the goals of their clients, 
because they endeavor to ensure that those clients had goals beyond 
simply receiving monetary relief for themselves.  In this way, service to 
the cause and service to the client by class action lawyers become one 
and the same.  As a result, the normal tension between client and cause 
presumed by much of the cause lawyering literature is far less 
pronounced in the class action context than in individual cases. 
 
 116. Interview 30012, supra note 114 (class action against credit card company for abusive 
debt collection practices); Interview 1011 (class action against mortgage broker for illegal loans) 
(Nov. 13, 2008). 
 117. Scheingold & Sarat, supra note 8, at 6. 
 118. One exception to this pattern is Corey Shdaimah’s Intersecting Identities:  Cause Lawyers 
as Legal Professionals and Social Movement Actors, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
(Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 2006), in which she observes that many legal services 
lawyers view serving their clients and pursuing the cause of social justice as one and the same. 
 119. Interview 30020, supra note 110. 
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3.  Plaintiffs’ Lawyers’ Perceptions of Named Plaintiffs’ Goals 
The lawyers interviewed for the study were asked to describe the 
named plaintiffs’ goals in filing the lawsuit.  The most striking aspect of 
their aggregate responses is how closely they track the aggregate 
response of the named plaintiffs to the question about their own goals.  
Like the named plaintiffs themselves, most of the lawyers attributed 
multiple goals to their clients.  The average number of named plaintiff 
goals identified by lawyers was 2.1, the median was 2, and the mode was 
2 (the figures for the named plaintiffs’ self identification of goals was an 
average of 2.3, a median of 2, and a mode of 2).  Moreover, the lawyers 
attributed roughly the same distribution of individual and collective 
justice goals to their named plaintiffs as the named plaintiffs attributed 
to themselves.  Thus, for example, twenty-four of the twenty-nine 
lawyers (83%) who specifically identified named plaintiff goals said that 
their clients harbored collective justice goals, while seventeen of twenty 
named plaintiffs (85%) self-identified collective justice goals.  And 
while 48% of the lawyers attributed a combination of self-interest and 
collective justice goals to their clients, 50% of the named plaintiffs 
attributed such a combination to themselves.  This correlation between 
the named plaintiffs’ self-identification of goals and the attorneys’ 
speculation as to those goals is also present when we look only at the 
responses of those attorneys whose clients were included in the study.120 
Lawyers’ descriptive comments about named plaintiffs’ goals 
underscore their awareness of the overlapping and complex array of 
those goals, particularly those relating to the named plaintiffs’ desire for 
collective justice.  They also demonstrate the attorneys’ awareness of the 
named plaintiffs’ anger towards the defendant: 
They were really offended.  This often happens with class 
representatives.  They want to see justice done. 121 
Well, you know, she was kind of the ideal main plaintiff.  Just really 
pissed off when she found out she had gotten screwed.122 
They were all upset. In these kinds of cases, almost all of the FDCPA 
[Fair Debt Collection Practices Act] class action litigation I’ve done     
. . . the plaintiffs are always upset and scared by the letters they get and 
 
 120. For example, the average number of named plaintiff goals identified by lawyers whose 
clients participated in the study was 1.9, the median was 2 and the mode was 2. 
 121. Telephone Interview 1015 (Nov. 24, 2008) (class action against bank for overcharging on 
car insurance). 
 122. Interview 1007, supra note 109. 
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then they’re outraged when they find out that what the letters say is 
bogus.  And so their goals are always, “We want to stop this.”  Now 
whether it’s out of the sense of personal vindictiveness or the greater 
social good I couldn’t tell you, but their goals are to stop this.123 
I think he was interested in it primarily for doing the right thing.  He 
likes cars.  He’s kind of a car guy.  He takes pride in this particular car 
and he felt that if there was a defect out there that could cause harm to 
people.  And people had in fact been killed in this car, civilians and 
police officers because of high impact collisions that had caused fires.  
He felt that if there was something he could do about it and working 
with attorneys to do it he’d be interested in doing that.”124 
And even where lawyers attributed a greater self-interest motive to 
their clients, they often placed it within the larger context of a desire for 
respect and fair treatment. As one lawyer noted: 
I think [the named plaintiff] was mad as hell at his insurance company 
and that it had hurt him financially so it was very, very similar to the 
same kind of motivations you would see in an individual case as 
opposed to a class action case because there was so much money 
involved for him.  Five grand was a lot and he was pissed . . . . He 
wanted his money.  And he, more than anything, like so many people, 
it’s just being disrespected and a lack of customer service that it’s 
[about] hurt feelings . . . . And they don’t like being told that they’re 
insignificant and that what they have to say doesn’t matter and that 
they can be pushed around.125 
This awareness of named plaintiff motivation is particularly 
noteworthy because most of the lawyers in the study said that they spend 
less time communicating with named plaintiffs than they do with their 
clients in individual cases.  One lawyer attributed the relative 
infrequency of communication with named plaintiffs to the relatively 
modest individual monetary reward at stake in most class actions: 
Well, typically in a class action the plaintiffs have less at stake 
economically or otherwise than they would in an individual case.  So, 
if there’s less at stake the person tends to be less involved, less 
concerned.  It’s not like their whole life turns around the resolution of 
the lawsuit.  For example, if you represent someone in a personal 
 
 123. Interview 30017, in Portland, Or. (Oct. 26, 2008) (class action against debt collection 
company for standard form collection letters). 
 124. Telephone Interview 30046 (Nov. 4, 2009) (class action against car manufacturer for 
design defect). Interestingly, the named plaintiff in this case stated that his only goal was to get his 
own car fixed.  Interview 30037, supra note 75. 
 125. Interview 30020, supra note 110. 
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injury case that’s been in an automobile accident and they’re trying to 
receive compensation for their medical expenses and to go on with 
their life they have a great deal of focus on the litigation.  Whereas if 
you represent someone in a consumer class action where they might 
have been overcharged $15 their stake in the litigation is not as 
great.126 
Another lawyer felt that communicating with the named plaintiff 
was often futile: 
The other thing about communicating with clients around class actions 
that I find is often times you can give them all the details as to the ins 
and outs as to what’s going on with the law and the case, and the 
statute, and the procedure and so on. . . . And sometimes you get the 
sense that it’s going in one ear and out the other to some extent.  
Because they’re not really familiar with everything but you try to break 
it down and explain it as best as you can.127 
One would expect this less frequent and sometimes frustrating 
communication between lawyers and class representatives to exacerbate 
the disconnect over client goals that Relis and others have observed 
between lawyers and clients in individual cases.128  Why, then, do the 
class action lawyers in this study seem to be acutely aware of the range 
and complexity of the named plaintiff’s goals, including the desire for 
justice that many lawyers in individual cases either ignore or try to 
repress in their clients? 
The clearest explanation is that the lawyers usually want named 
plaintiffs with an array of goals, particularly collective justice goals, as 
well as a sense of anger or injustice directed towards the defendant.  
Such motivations render these named plaintiffs more likely to endure the 
lengthy litigation process and the temptation to accept early settlement 
offers that would provide them with individual compensation but leave 
the rest of the class without a recovery and their lawyer with only a 
modest fee.  And because the lawyers are often able to choose from a 
number of potential named plaintiffs, they can typically find one who 
harbors collective justice goals.129  The following statements from 
 
 126. Telephone Interview 30024 (Mar. 6, 2009) (class action against landlord for violation of 
rent control laws). 
 127. Interview 30046, supra note 124. 
 128. See Relis, It’s Not About the Money!, supra note 4, at 734-35. 
 129. As one lawyer explained:  “[F]rom the literally hundreds of people who had called us 
[about the defendant’s practice] we selected some people to interview [as named plaintiffs].”  
Interview 1008, supra note 115. 
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lawyers suggest that this is exactly the kind of person they seek as a 
named plaintiff: 
I want someone with a fire in the belly, because the money isn’t in 
it.130 
The people who make the best class reps are people who have a sense 
of justice and care for something beyond their self-interest.131 
I’m trying to gauge why the person is involved in the case.  I don’t 
have a problem with somebody who is looking to make money . . . But 
I’m also looking for some sort of spark:  ‘I’ve been pushed too far; I’m 
just not going to take it anymore . . . I want to stand up for myself and 
for some others.’  Because I find that those plaintiffs are much more 
resolute in seeing a case through.132 
On the other hand, many of the lawyers expressed strong 
reservations about named plaintiffs who are certain from the beginning 
that they want to lead a class action: 
If a guy walks in the office and says, ‘ABC happened to me and, boy, 
is this a great class action.  Let me tell you why,’ as a lawyer your 
antenna goes up right away:  ‘Well, wait a minute.  Is this guy angling 
for something?’133 
You don’t want somebody that calls you up wanting to file a class 
action.  I suppose there are exceptions to that rule, but I’ve had people 
call me and think they are going to get rich filing a class action, or they 
think that just because they got cheated somebody ought to have a 
class action filed against them.  Lay people don’t have much of a 
concept of what’s involved.134 
[The named plaintiff] needs to not have a personal agenda.135 
Thus, it appears that in choosing a suitable class representative, 
consumer class action lawyers seek someone willing to represent large 
numbers of persons but who was unaware of such willingness before 
 
 130. Interview 30013, supra note 37 (class action against airline company to recover employee 
benefits). 
 131. Telephone Interview 1012 (Nov. 17, 2008) (class action against credit insurance company 
for excessive interest charges). 
 132. Telephone Interview 30049 (Sept. 18, 2009) (class action against agricultural products 
company). 
 133. Telephone Interview 1013 (Nov. 26, 2009) (class action against debt collection company 
for standard form dunning letter). 
 134. Interview 1012, supra note 131. 
 135. Interview 30050, supra note 108. 
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they talked to the lawyer.  The lawyers find it easier to keep such named 
plaintiffs focused throughout the typically long class action process. 
A second explanation for the lawyers’ acute awareness of their 
clients’ collective justice goals is that in many cases those goals are 
instilled and nurtured by the lawyers themselves.  This nurturing process 
is a form of dispute transformation, though of a very different sort than 
the transformation that has been observed in individual disputes.  As 
noted earlier, the dispute transformation theory posits that lawyers in 
individual cases condition their clients as to the “legal realities” of the 
litigation system so that those clients will be satisfied with monetary 
compensation for their injuries and abandon previously held desires for 
other forms of retribution or recourse.136  The data gathered for this 
article suggests that class action lawyers engage in a form of dispute 
transformation markedly different from that associated with individual 
cases, but no less important for reaching an outcome that is mutually 
acceptable to both lawyer and client.  Class action lawyers see 
themselves as needing to cultivate and encourage what they perceive as 
the collective justice goals of their clients, rather than discourage those 
goals by transforming them into purely financial objectives, which is the 
typical pattern in individual cases.  For if the named plaintiff is—or 
becomes—only interested in personal financial gain, he or she would be 
easily attracted by a relatively small settlement offer and the class 
action—and the significant attorneys’ fees that normally accompany it—
would be jeopardized. 
The interviews for this article suggest that this transformation 
process occurs at as many as three different stages throughout the course 
of a class action, depending on the nature of the case and the 
sophistication of the client.  The first of these stages involves informing 
potential named plaintiffs that they have a legal claim and an 
opportunity for monetary damages in the first place.  Many plaintiffs in 
consumer protection cases are initially unaware that they are entitled to 
monetary relief; their only goal is to stop the offending conduct as it is 
applied to them, be it a harassing debt collection phone call, the 
repossession of their car, or an erroneous entry on their credit report.  
Only after they consult with an attorney do they realize that the 
applicable law permits prevailing plaintiffs to recover statutory damages 
and attorneys’ fees, regardless of whether they have actually sustained 
any direct financial harm as a result of the defendant’s conduct.  This is 
particularly true in the debt collection area, where Congress (as well as 
 
 136. Relis, It’s Not About the Money!, supra note 4, at 704-05. 
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many state legislatures) recognized the need for statutory damages as a 
deterrent against abusive collection activities, even when the debtor 
could not prove any resulting monetary loss.137 
Two of the plaintiffs’ lawyers described this first stage of dispute 
transformation as follows: 
[The named plaintiff] really didn’t know that she had been taken 
advantage of.  I told her that.138 
[The named plaintiff] was aware that the purchase price that they paid 
for a vehicle was several thousand dollars more than the book value     
. . . . I had had other clients who had . . . this issue with [the defendant] 
and I had brought several suits against them for doing this . . . . [The 
named plaintiff’s] complaint was that they thought they had overpaid 
for the car.  In reality they did, but not nearly as much as they thought 
they did.  The reason why the purchase price was higher was because 
of the inflated down payment . . . . We would have brought them in 
and explained to them what happened and told them that the real harm 
here was the sales tax . . . .139 
Once the named plaintiff is aware of a potential monetary recovery 
(having known of it previously or been so informed by her attorney), 
most of the lawyers in this study then move to the second phase of 
dispute transformation in the class action context:  they transform the 
dispute from individual compensation to relief for the entire class, be it 
monetary or injunctive.  In most cases, this stage is necessary because 
pursuing such a dispute on an individual level is financially unfeasible 
for the attorney: 
I mean what they were looking for was legal help to get their money 
back.  That’s why they came asking for help.  And we helped to 
channel that goal into a wider goal and when offered the possibility of 
helping others that had been similarly treated and ripped off they were 
very, very interested in doing that.  That’s not what they came in 
seeking, ‘I want to file a class action.’  No.  They came in, ‘I’m getting 
ripped off by someone.’  And then when they learn that many others 
have . . . sought help and that there is a legal device available whereby 
they can through their own lawsuit help others in the same situation 
they were eager to proceed on that basis.  So, I think there was a lot of 
 
 137. See Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq. (2006); WIS. STAT. § 
427 (2009). 
 138. Telephone Interview 1009 (Nov. 7, 2008) (class action against finance company for 
excessive re-financing fees). 
 139. Interview 1001 (Sept. 29, 2009) (class action against automobile dealership for excessive 
sales tax fee). 
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public interest on the part of the named plaintiff that they eagerly 
embraced despite the fact that that’s not what brought them into the 
office in the first place.140 
According to this attorney, the named plaintiff harbored latent 
collective justice goals that the lawyer encouraged by discussing the 
possibility of a class action.  Other lawyers similarly described this 
process of channeling their named plaintiff’s desire for justice into a 
willingness to serve as a class representative: 
Well, she filed the lawsuit because . . . in her case they [a rent-to-own 
company] were trying to repossess some furniture, a TV, and a 
computer from her and she felt like she had come to realize that she 
had been not fairly treated.  And so that’s why she showed up and we 
said, ‘Look, you know doing your lawsuit for a few hundred bucks is 
just, you can’t do it.  It doesn’t make sense.  But we think that this 
company is violating the law with all of its customers like you and 
would you be willing to stand up as a class representative?’  And she 
was.141 
I think that my view of human nature is that most people want to do 
good.  I mean they’re interested in themselves, but they also want to do 
a broader good.  They also want to have some meaning in their lives, 
and when you discuss with them the statistics, demonstrating that this 
is industry wide, this gives them a greater reason to go through this 
process.142 
I think that when the client first came to see me [about a dispute with a 
car dealership over a salvaged vehicle] she really had no idea that there 
was a class action potential [regarding excessive registration fees].  
Now having said that, when I explained it to her, I think my client was 
very much motivated in seeking justice for everybody in her similar 
position because obviously she had been wronged by the dealership 
and she wanted to see justice done.143 
These statements reveal a deliberate, conscious, and unapologetic 
transformation of the clients’ dispute by the plaintiffs’ lawyers.  They 
suggest that this stage of the dispute transformation process is a matter 
of appealing to the named plaintiffs’ underlying, though perhaps 
 
 140. Interview 1016, supra note 115. 
 141. Telephone Interview 1014 (Dec. 2, 2008) (class action against rent-to-own company 
regarding repossession practices). 
 142. Interview 2002, supra note 37 (class action against a mortgage company for 
misrepresentation). 
 143. Telephone Interview 1005 (Nov. 26, 2008) (class action against automobile dealership for 
overcharging registration fees). 
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unstated, desire to seek justice for large numbers of persons.  It also 
frequently involves the lawyers altering the underlying nature of the 
dispute (e.g., from individual concerns over the named plaintiff’s 
salvaged vehicle to a class-wide dispute about excessive registration 
fees).  And for the most part, the named plaintiffs interviewed for this 
study were willing recipients of those appeals.  For example the client of 
the lawyer who made the latter statement said that she was only aware of 
the class action implications of her dispute when her lawyer brought it to 
her attention: 
I think it was six months after I filed my lawsuit that’s when my 
lawyer saw the need for a class action suit. I was like ‘OK, let’s get 
that money and return it to the people that they stole it from’; the 
registration fees.144 
Another lawyer described this channeling process as an effort to 
meld the named plaintiff’s goals to his own.  And if that effort is 
unsuccessful (and assuming the lawyer has other potential named 
plaintiffs from which to choose), the un-transformable client is rejected 
as a named plaintiff: 
I think that our client’s goals when they first contacted us were 
certainly different.  They had no idea we were going to be talking 
about a class action.  They had very little idea of what a class action 
was but I think that through my initial meeting process that our goals 
were the same.  And my intake process is designed to achieve that 
result and if it doesn’t then we don’t go forward.145 
One attorney’s response was particularly interesting in this regard 
because of his awareness that being a named plaintiff entails enduring a 
significant amount of time, effort, and abuse from defendant’s counsel: 
The system is set up so that you pretty much have to be an idiot to be 
willing to be a class rep.  Well, in a consumer case anyway, where the 
amount at issue for any normal person is going to be fairly small 
whether its $10 or $100 or $200 because it is really irrelevant.  But 
people get angry and they feel like they want to do something.  But the 
truth of the matter is that the amount of time that it’s going to take 
them to do it and the near certainty that they’ll have to spend a day 
giving a deposition and the possibility that they may have to testify in 
court or find documents that are difficult to find and take a lot of 
looking and they can’t even conceive of why it has anything to do with 
 
 144. Interview 30027, supra note 89. 
 145. Interview 1001, supra note 139. 
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the case that they thought they had.  And the fact that the cases go on 
for so long, which is just kind of inconceivable to an ordinary person 
unless they’ve had other exposure to litigation, and from some kind of 
purely rational economic sense even the possibility of an incentive 
award, which is uncertain of course.  I mean it doesn’t balance out all 
these disadvantages.  And then, of course, you have to make them 
understand that if they file the case as a class action they have a 
responsibility on behalf of all class members that their case can’t just 
be settled by using the class as leverage.  And the only thing that’s 
going to make them want to do it enough so that they’re willing to 
serve is a desire to perform a public service for people.  I’ve had pretty 
good luck persuading people of that.146 
This lawyer’s detailed cost-benefit analysis illustrates why a purely 
economic model for named plaintiff behavior in the class action context 
falls short:  it cannot measure the intangible value of wanting to see 
justice done for the public generally.  Indeed, the named plaintiff in this 
case developed a sense of public service (buttressed by considerable 
anger) after her lawyers told her about what the defendant was doing to 
others: 
I wanted blood.  Particularly when I found out what [the defendant 
was] doing to the other class [members].  I didn’t feel damaged but 
then when I heard about the elderly people.  They were an awful 
company with huge interest rates and big late payments . . . they were 
horrible over the phone . . . .147 
Other named plaintiffs expressed a similar sense of willingness to 
have their goals transformed, or widened, to include relief for the entire 
class: 
[Our attorneys] made clear that their expectation of us was that we 
were going to go all the way with it and that they made clear that there 
was not going to be a lot of money in it.  You’re doing it for everybody 
not for your own glory or remuneration.148 
I started out and all I wanted was my $8,000 and he said, “Well, that’s 
not enough” so they went up to, I don’t know what it was, 30 or 40 and 
next thing I know the last papers I looked at I was suing for $225,000.  
Well, they ended up putting it all together in a class action suit which 
 
 146. Interview 30011, in Portland, Or. (Oct. 24, 2008) (class action against credit card 
company for abusive debt collection practices). 
 147. Interview 30028, supra note 78. 
 148. Interview 30043, supra note 84. 
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is fine, I didn’t want $225,000.  I wanted the $8,000 I was promised     
. . . .149 
None of the named plaintiffs in this study expressed the resentment 
that “transformed” clients feel in individual cases when their desires for 
justice are either ignored or channeled into monetary compensation.150  
Quite the contrary:  whether they approach their attorneys with 
knowledge of the scope of the defendant’s conduct and a wish to 
prohibit it, or whether they were initially only concerned at the outset 
about their personal situation, they relish the idea of assisting a broad 
group of consumers.  It plays into their sense of right and wrong, and 
illustrates their interest in being agents of governance.  Those 
uninterested in adopting a broader view of the dispute are unlikely to be 
selected as named plaintiffs in the first place, assuming the lawyer has a 
choice in the matter. 
The third phase of dispute transformation in the consumer class 
action context occurs when it is necessary for the lawyers to ensure that 
the named plaintiffs “stay the course” throughout the frequently 
protracted class action process.  As described by the lawyers, this phase 
of the process resembles a form of cheerleading or encouragement, 
rather than transformation: 
Their goals remain consistent but in a case like this [involving a 
standard form debt collection letter] they’re not really required to have 
very much involvement.  So the anger they had in 1996 when they got 
the letter is that they may have to be reminded about five years later 
when they have to make a decision about the case.  I try to maintain 
contact with them to essentially get them to keep their head in the 
game.  But they have their lives. I mean I’m spending hundreds of 
thousands of hours on these cases and they’re spending 15 hours 
spread out over five years so they have their lives going on.  They’re 
very upset when they see me and whenever they think about the 
situation they get upset again, but they spend 99.9% of their life not 
thinking about the case which is not the same as me.151 
Some of the lawyers consciously deal with this problem at the 
outset of the case, and whenever their clients become frustrated with 
litigation delays: 
 
 149. Interview 30040, supra note 89. 
 150. See SARAT & FELSTINER, supra note 3, at 93; Relis, It’s Not About the Money!, supra note 
4. 
 151. Interview 30017, supra note 123. 
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You know, I talk to the clients a lot.  I let them know I’m available to 
them anytime they are frustrated with the process.  Go ahead and give 
me a call and we’ll talk about it.  And I also try very hard at the 
beginning of the case, once someone has agreed to become  a class 
representative, which I am really up front about in terms of what their 
responsibilities are going to be and that it is not a glorified position . . . 
And I try to tell them early on that this is going to seem like it grinds 
very slowly, and there is a chance that we could get derailed, you 
know, there could be something that happens on a motion to dismiss 
that either really hurts our side or really hurts their side, and the party 
that feels aggrieved by that decision decides to take it to the court of 
appeals.  If that happens, the entire case can get sidetracked until the 
court of appeals decides whatever that issue is . . . . So I try to get them 
to understand that, yeah, this could go a little bit sideways for a while.  
And that they’ve got to be patient.  And then I feel my duty is to be 
available to them when they get frustrated with the system.152 
Sometimes these cases drag on or slow down that the second or third 
time I say it, it kind of reinforces, ‘yeah, this is what I signed on for 
and it’s really no surprise.’  I also try to emphasize what brought them 
into the case in the front end that they were frustrated about something 
or they wanted to champion something larger than their own cause.153 
Another lawyer related a similar process of encouragement, linking 
it to the goal of ensuring that the representative plaintiffs not become 
attracted by “pick off” settlement offers (i.e., relatively modest offers 
usually proffered early in the case) that would more than compensate the 
named plaintiff for her monetary loss but would derail the class action 
by disqualifying her as inadequate under Federal Rule 23(a) or its state 
court equivalent: 
When I talk to people from the first time forward, I try to lay out how 
this will be difficult.  These cases take three to five years, that you’ll 
be deposed, that the defendants will raise every procedural and other 
hurdle they can think of, that the defendants at some point down the 
road will offer you a bribe.  They’ll offer me a bribe, the bribe being 
individual settlement at a price well above the value of the individual 
settlement, or offering me costs and attorney’s fees above what would 
possibly be reasonable for an individual case.  So in other words, I try 
to get them this information in advance, so that when it does happen,    
 
 152. Telephone Interview 2007 (Apr. 8, 2008) (class action against trustees of a retirement 
benefit plan for breach of fiduciary duty). 
 153. Interview 30049, supra note 132. 
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. . . . ‘Here’s where they’re offering the bribe, and we’ve talked about 
this before, where do you stand on this?’154 
In this way, class action lawyers try to anticipate and counteract the 
tendency of litigation delays to, as Felstiner et al. put it, change 
disputants’ views of the process from “useful procedure” to “pointless 
frustration.”155  This process of reminding the named plaintiffs about 
both the nature of the lawsuit they have agreed to steward, as well as the 
responsibilities of that stewardship, is also illustrative of the kind of 
control that the dispute transformation literature attributes to attorneys.  
In their review of the literature on this subject, Sarat and Felstiner note 
that in many practice settings, “lawyers exercise power by manipulating 
their clients’ definitions of the situation and of their role.”156  This study 
provides ample evidence of this exercise of power by class action 
attorneys over named plaintiffs.  Indeed, given that class action lawyers 
often have the luxury of selecting named plaintiffs who are willing to 
align their goals with the attorneys, this power is more pronounced in 
class actions than in individual cases, where the client normally chooses 
the lawyer. 
As many of the comments above suggest, at the start of the process, 
many named plaintiffs are unaware of the nature and scope of the 
underlying case.  And certainly most of them are ignorant of the duties 
of a class representative.  Their lawyers fill those gaps in knowledge, 
thus transforming the clients’ “definition of the situation and of their 
role”157 in a way that increases the likelihood that the case will achieve 
the results sought by the attorney and the client. 
In addition, this conscious encouragement process is another way in 
which lawyers, according to Relis, “condition clients on ‘legal system 
realities.’”158  But in the class action context, the purpose of this 
conditioning is less about persuading clients to minimize their 
aspirations of what they might be able to achieve through the legal 
system.  Rather, it is just the opposite:  to encourage them to maintain 
the broadly focused aspirations that made them willing to serve as a 
named plaintiff in the first place, often after first learning of the 
opportunity from their attorney. 
 
 154. Interview 2002, supra note 37. 
 155. See Felstiner et al., supra note 3, at 648. 
 156. See SARAT & FELSTINER, supra note 3, at 20. 
 157. Id. 
 158. See Relis, It’s Not About the Money!, supra note 4, at 704. 
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Despite this general awareness and conscious shaping of named 
plaintiff goals, there was one such motivation that the lawyers never 
mentioned:  the desire to obtain information about the defendant’s 
practices.  Four named plaintiffs listed it as a goal, but none of the 
lawyers (including those who represented those four named plaintiffs) 
attributed it to their clients.  While perhaps simply an anomaly of this 
particular study sample, one other explanation is that lawyers see 
information gathering as a regular part of the litigation process, the 
means to a successfully resolved case.  It is not, however, an end in 
itself.  Indeed, none of the lawyers identified it as one of their own goals 
in initiating their class action.  Some named plaintiffs, on the other hand, 
see it differently. They, like their counterparts’ individual cases, often 
want an explanation for the defendant’s conduct and feel that a lawsuit is 
a good way to obtain it.  Lawyers likely assume that they need no such 
explanation; they assume that the reason for the defendant’s conduct is 
the desire to make a profit, sometimes illegally. 
The majority of lawyers also felt that the named plaintiff’s goals 
did not change throughout the course of the lawsuit, which accurately 
reflects the unchanging view of most of the named plaintiffs themselves.  
To the extent that the lawyers perceived such a change, for the most part 
they attributed it to the fulfillment of certain goals, the discovery of 
additional information about the defendant’s actions giving rise to the 
lawsuit, or the conduct of the defendant or its attorney during the course 
of the litigation.  Thus, for example, a lawyer representing a class of 
consumers who alleged breach of warranty for faulty brakes stated that 
the named plaintiffs were initially only interested in either a cash refund 
or new car. But as the case went on, he noted, “the plaintiff’s goals 
changed to just getting justice.  Money was less of a goal, though it was 
still important.”159  And another plaintiffs’ attorney, who represented a 
class of consumers alleging that their former employer breached its 
fiduciary duty with respect to their retirement benefits, indicated that 
while at first the named plaintiffs were only interested in recovering the 
value of their benefits, they eventually wanted the defendant’s corporate 
officers to go to jail once they became aware of a parallel criminal 
investigation.160  Other attorneys indicated that the named plaintiffs 
became angrier as a result of what they perceived as being subjected to 
harassment during the course of the case, usually during the their 
deposition.  One lawyer summarized this phenomenon as follows: 
 
 159. Interview 2003 (Mar. 28, 2008). 
 160. Interview 2007, supra note 152. 
46
Akron Law Review, Vol. 44 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol44/iss1/3
8_MEILI_WESTERN.DOC 2/11/20119:52 AM 
2011] COLLECTIVE JUSTICE OR PERSONAL GAIN? 113 
When they get [personally] attacked like that [in depositions] usually 
the clients will turn on the defendant and say, ‘See, that’s exactly that 
arrogance, that rude callous indifference to what you do to people and 
your actions is exactly why I’m bringing the class action against you. 
And now you ain’t seen nothing yet.’  And they’ll start sticking to their 
guns and they’ll get rougher and tougher the more that the case goes 
on.  Which makes it kind of fun because it is sometimes very hard to 
get people to get motivated about consumer issues because they just 
don’t tend to rip people’s lives apart.161 
In sum, this study’s empirical data on goals suggest that named 
plaintiffs are similar to plaintiffs in individual cases in that they seek an 
array of outcomes from litigation that go beyond monetary 
compensation and fall within the general rubric of justice being done.  
They maintain and sometimes intensify these motivations during the 
litigation process.  And, also similar to plaintiffs in individual cases, 
they sometimes seek remedies that a lawsuit cannot provide, such as 
changed corporate behavior throughout a particular industry.  On the 
other hand, their lawyers are more aware of these non-monetary goals 
than lawyers in individual cases.  Indeed, these class action lawyers 
actively seek out named plaintiffs willing to broaden their desire for 
individual relief into efforts to seek justice for all class members.  The 
lawyers then nurture and encourage those collective justice goals 
throughout the course of the lawsuit.  This nurturing process typically 
begins when the lawyers first discuss the possibility of a class action 
with the client, and continues through the duration of the lawsuit.  The 
lawyers frequently remind the named plaintiffs of the larger social 
justice purpose behind the case to prevent the named plaintiff from 
losing interest.  These conversations, even if less frequent than 
communications between lawyer and client in individual cases, both 
reinforce the named plaintiffs’ collective justice goals and make the 
lawyers acutely aware  of them. 
B. Comparative Analysis of Satisfaction with the Case Result 
The named plaintiffs’ reasons for being satisfied with the result of 
their class action tracked their goals in filing it.  However, the lawyers 
were not as fully aware of the range of these reasons as they were about 
the named plaintiffs goals. 
 
 161. Interview 30020, supra note 110. 
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1. Named Plaintiffs’ Satisfaction 
Most of the named plaintiffs expressed satisfaction with the result 
of the class action.  This is not surprising, given that their lawyers 
selected the case that was the subject of the interview and, for the most 
part, selected cases featuring ostensibly successful results.  However, the 
reasons for that satisfaction, as well as their lawyers’ perceptions of the 
reasons for that satisfaction, are intriguing.  Of particular note is the 
progression in attitudes and expectations from stated goals to reasons for 
satisfaction. 
In the aggregate, the named plaintiffs’ reasons for being either 
satisfied or dissatisfied with the result of the case mirrored their goals for 
pursuing the case.  For example, while thirteen named plaintiffs included 
self-interest (such as monetary compensation or a repaired product) 
within their goals for pursuing the case, twelve named plaintiffs reported 
being satisfied with the result because of those reasons.  Similarly, while 
seventeen named plaintiffs identified some form of collective justice as 
at least one goal in filing the class action, all twenty of the interviewed 
named plaintiffs cited collective justice reasons for being either satisfied 
or dissatisfied with the result.162  These collective justice reasons for 
satisfaction included monetary compensation for the entire class, 
stopping the offending practice, demonstrating that the defendants’ 
conduct was wrong, and serving notice on other companies in the 
relevant industry that the offending conduct would not be tolerated.  
Similarly, while ten of the named plaintiffs articulated both self-interest 
and collective justice goals, eleven of the named plaintiffs were satisfied 
for a combination of these reasons.  Not surprisingly then, the named 
plaintiffs’ reasons for satisfaction or dissatisfaction were nearly as 
overlapping and complex as their goals.  The average number of such 
reasons was 1.9, the median was 2, and the mode was 2.  The 
corresponding figures for number of goals were 2.3, 2 and 2. 
However, when we look inside these aggregate numbers, and 
compare them with the named plaintiffs’ goals, interesting patterns 
emerge.  First, while non-monetary collective justice goals (such as 
stopping the offending conduct) were listed by nearly twice as many 
named plaintiffs as monetary collective justice goals (i.e., obtaining 
 
 162. The three named plaintiffs who expressed dissatisfaction with the case stated collective 
justice reasons:  two were disappointed that the class was not certified (even though they received a 
monetary settlement for their individual claims) and one wanted “a stiffer penalty” against the 
defendant company and its executives.  Interview 30032, supra note 91; Interview 30042, supra 
note 90 (class action against mortgage company for misrepresentation; Interview 30043, supra note 
84. 
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monetary compensation for the entire class), those proportions nearly 
reversed themselves when named plaintiffs articulated reasons for being 
satisfied with the results of the case:  twelve cited monetary 
compensation as a reason for being satisfied or dissatisfied with the 
result, while eight cited non-monetary collective justice reasons.  This is 
likely because class-wide monetary compensation was either the only, or 
the most noticeable, form of relief obtained in the case. 
Second, tracking the shift from named plaintiffs’ goals to reasons 
for satisfaction with the result reveals that named plaintiffs become more 
interested in collective justice than individual recovery as the case 
progresses.  For example, of the eleven satisfied named plaintiffs who 
had expressed self-interest goals for initiating the lawsuit, only seven 
said that they were satisfied for self-interested reasons.  The other four 
said they were satisfied for collective justice reasons.  On the other hand, 
all of the fifteen satisfied named plaintiffs who had expressed collective 
justice goals were satisfied for collective justice reasons.  Furthermore, 
of the ten satisfied named plaintiffs who had expressed a combination of 
self-interest and collective justice goals, six were satisfied for a 
combination of self-interest and collective justice reasons, and four were 
satisfied for purely collective justice reasons.  None were satisfied for 
only self-interest reasons.  Indeed, the only named plaintiff who was 
satisfied for purely self-interest reasons was one of the three named 
plaintiffs who had articulated only a self-interest goal.  The other two 
were satisfied for a combination of self-interest and collective justice 
reasons. 
This shift in focus from self-interest to collective justice is likely 
the result of a number of factors revealed through interviews, including a 
greater awareness of—and anger about—the defendant’s conduct as 
information becomes available through discovery, the dispute 
transformation process alluded to above, and the sense of satisfaction at 
having helped to achieve a result that spreads relief among a large group 
of people. 
A third notable observation in the responses regarding satisfaction 
is that many named plaintiffs believe that the class action produced 
results beyond the specific legal remedies sought in the complaint.  One 
of these extra-legal remedies was influencing corporate conduct 
throughout a particular industry: 
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I was satisfied . . . the case was won.  The point was made, and I’m 
quite sure that the next time around [debt collectors] will look more in 
depth at what they’re sending out to others before they give it to  
them . . . .163 
They won a huge settlement.  It was big enough to serve as a warning 
to other insurance companies not to engage in this practice.164 
[W]hat I found from this was . . . it made other companies…[s]tart 
rethinking what they were doing.  When I went into [name of store] 
there was a big smile on my face because I was seeing the changes 
happening based on this lawsuit.  It was a really great feeling to see the 
changes going on in the industry.165 
These statements reveal a faith in the class action as providing not 
only tangible relief to the members of a particular class, but justice to all 
consumers.  Armed with the class action, these named plaintiffs exhibit a 
sense of empowerment at having participated in a process they believe 
brought about change throughout an entire industry.  This is very 
different from the feelings of disappointment with the legal system that 
many individual litigants feel, even after an ostensibly successful 
resolution of their case.  Indeed, even where one of the named plaintiffs 
was cynical about the ability of the legal system to permanently alter the 
behavior of corporations, he nevertheless felt a sense of pride in having 
used that flawed system to call the defendant insurance company to task: 
I know that they’ll do it again.  This is America.  You can get away 
with anything here.  And they’ll do it again . . . . Maybe a few years 
down the road but they’ll do it again. I’m glad I brought it [the class 
action] about . . . . I’m just glad it happened the way it happened 
because an insurance company is an insurance company but when they 
do stuff against the American people as a conglomerate they shouldn’t 
be able to get away with it.  And it really stinks that we have to take 
them to court to do stuff like this.166 
As this statement suggests, named plaintiffs have a complex and 
somewhat conflicted view of the U.S. legal system in the class action 
context.  On the one hand, they decry its inability to permanently 
prohibit corporations from abusing consumers.  Yet, on the other hand, 
 
 163. Interview 30034, supra note 29. 
 164. Interview 1017, supra note 84. 
 165. Interview 30035, supra note 82 (class action against manufacturer of nutritional products 
for misrepresentation). 
 166. Interview 30039, supra note 76. 
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there is a resigned but almost patriotic sense that it is the only way to 
curb corporate misconduct.  Some named plaintiffs thus become 
reluctant agents of governance, spurred into action because, in their 
view, someone has to hold corporations accountable. 
The previous quote is also indicative of the other way in which 
many named plaintiffs see the class action providing relief beyond what 
is technically available under the law; i.e., as a means of demonstrating 
that the defendant was wrong.  Indeed, for some named plaintiffs this 
sense of vindication was at least as satisfying as the material 
compensation for the class: 
I did get almost all of what I asked for.  And I guess the results were 
also that they sat there with, how do I say it, they had cake on their 
face when they got done because we were right and they were wrong.  
And I was very satisfied monetarily and the way it turned out.167 
We won.  I’m very satisfied.  I don’t know about the dollar amount but 
I’m satisfied with what they found, that they were in the wrong 
totally.168 
It achieved my goal which was to get [the defendants] to recognize and 
justify and rectify a problem that they’d caused.169 
These comments suggest that many named plaintiffs believe that 
their class action was a struggle between right and wrong and that they 
were satisfied because “right” won out.  It is not surprising that this 
sense of right versus wrong is prominent in the class action context, 
given the number of claimants and potential recovery involved, the high 
public profile of many class action defendants, and the way that 
plaintiffs’ attorneys inculcate in the named plaintiff the importance of 
looking beyond their self-interest and focusing on what is best for the 
entire class.  The following statements underscore how many named 
plaintiffs see the class action as the last best hope of holding 
corporations accountable: 
The class action suit is the consumers’ only recourse in many 
situations. I believe in government regulations. I do not believe that 
major corporations have my best interests at heart in all cases. I don’t 
think that corporations care about their customers except for the money 
that they can bring in . . . . They will treat them badly if they think they 
 
 167. Interview 30040, supra note 89. 
 168. Interview 30039, supra note 76. 
 169. Telephone Interview 30038, supra note 78 (class action against automobile manufacturer 
for defective part). 
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can get away with it and still make money. Part of the reason the legal 
system exists is to slap them when they don’t.170 
I think the only way that citizens can even stand up to corporations is 
through class actions and I doubt that class actions, I mean I’m sure 
there are lawyers that maybe try to do class actions to make money but 
they wouldn’t get any results if it wasn’t wrong what the company or 
the party had done to begin with.  I just think it’s a good way for 
citizens to keep powerful organizations in check.171 
A final noteworthy finding about the progression from goals to 
satisfaction was that, while four named plaintiffs said that they filed the 
lawsuit, in part, because they wanted to obtain information about the 
defendants’ practices, only one stated the receipt of such information as 
a reason for their satisfaction with the case.172  This shift is probably due 
to a number of factors.  First, when the named plaintiffs reflected on 
their reasons for being satisfied with the result in the case, they normally 
focus on the settlement, rather than on information about the defendant’s 
practices which emerged during the discovery process in the midst of the 
lawsuit.  Second, the named plaintiffs may not have been made aware of 
the information that emerged during the discovery process.  And third, 
some named plaintiffs who want information about the defendant’s 
practices are satisfied because, among other things, the case 
demonstrated that the defendant was wrong.  This was true for one of the 
four named plaintiffs in this study interested in obtaining information 
about the defendant’s practices.173  These named plaintiffs may have felt 
that the information about the defendant’s practices revealed that the 
defendant was wrong.  For them, successfully achieving the goal of 
obtaining information was transformed into satisfaction on the grounds 
that the defendant was shown to be in the wrong. 
2. Plaintiffs’ Lawyers’ Satisfaction 
Given that the lawyers selected the cases on which to focus their 
interviews, it is not surprising that the vast majority were satisfied with 
the result.  Most attributed their satisfaction to obtaining relief for the 
class in the form of monetary damages for the class, specific 
performance, and/or a cessation of the defendant’s practice.  Several also 
mentioned their receipt of attorneys’ fees.  Three pointed to making 
 
 170. Interview 1018, supra note 74. 
 171. Interview 30042, supra note 90. 
 172. Interview 30033, supra note 78. 
 173. Interview 30034, supra note 29. 
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good law through reported opinions on class certification and 
substantive law.174  To the extent that the lawyers were dissatisfied with 
the result, the most common reason was that they had hoped to recover 
more money for the class. 
3. Plaintiffs’ Lawyers’ Perceptions of Named Plaintiffs’ 
Satisfaction 
The interviews of lawyers included an open-ended question about 
whether—and why—they felt that the named plaintiff was satisfied with 
the result in the case.  The distribution of lawyers’ responses to that 
question suggests that most are well aware of the range of reasons for 
named plaintiff satisfaction.175  Thus, the lawyers’ speculation as to their 
clients’ reasons for being satisfied or unsatisfied with the result of the 
case fell into the same two general categories that the named plaintiffs 
identified:  self-interest and collective justice.  And the latter category 
was divided, as it was among the named plaintiffs, into obtaining money 
for the entire class and other forms of collective relief such as stopping 
the offending practice.  The lawyers were twice as likely to identify 
collective justice as a reason for the named plaintiffs’ satisfaction as they 
were to identify self-interest.  This accurately tracked the proportion of 
self-interest and collective justice reasons for satisfaction articulated by 
the named plaintiffs.  It also contrasts with Relis’ conclusion in the 
individual medical malpractice case context that most lawyers think that 
their clients are mainly interested in money.176  This awareness among 
the class action lawyers is not surprising, given the preceding discussion 
about how these lawyers shape the named plaintiffs’ collective justice 
goals.  One would expect these lawyers to attribute named plaintiff 
satisfaction to fulfillment of the goals they helped shape. 
However, while the lawyers were cognizant of the reasons for client 
satisfaction, they somewhat underestimated the complexity and 
overlapping nature of those reasons.  For example, while four named 
plaintiffs were satisfied because the defendant had been proven wrong, 
none of the lawyers (including, of course, the lawyers of those particular 
named plaintiffs) cited that as a reason for named plaintiff satisfaction.  
And, while three named plaintiffs said that they were satisfied, in part, 
because the result had served notice on other members of the relevant 
 
 174. Interviews 1013, 1016, 30046. 
 175. Four of the lawyers did not cite a reason for their belief that the named plaintiff was 
satisfied with the result in the case. 
 176. See generally Relis, It’s Not About the Money!, supra note 4. 
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industry, none of their lawyers mentioned this as a reason for their 
clients’ satisfaction.  These discrepancies suggest that many named 
plaintiffs, like the literature tells us is true of their counterparts in 
individual cases, have a broader set of expectations about the legal 
system than their lawyers think they do.  Lawyers focus on the relief that 
the legal system can deliver.177  In individual cases that is mostly 
monetary compensation, and in class actions it is class-wide monetary 
and injunctive relief.  Most class action settlements do not, however, 
include any admission of wrongdoing on the part of the defendant (quite 
the contrary – such settlements usually explicitly state that the defendant 
does not admit liability) or admonitions to other members of a particular 
industry.  These limitations do not, however, deter many named 
plaintiffs from believing that the class action achieved those very results. 
Taken together, this study’s findings about named plaintiff goals 
and satisfaction suggests yet another intriguing twist on dispute 
transformation in the class action context:  while class action lawyers are 
very successful in shaping named plaintiffs’ collective justice goals to 
conform to legal system realities (primarily money for the class and 
injunctive relief) they cannot control the way that those named plaintiffs 
view the result of the case.  In individual cases, even where a case is 
nominally successful, plaintiffs’ reaction to the result is sometimes 
negative because they did not achieve the non-monetary, justice-oriented 
goals they harbored throughout the litigation.178  In the class action 
context, the effect is quite different, and leads to a more positive reaction 
to the litigation process: many named plaintiffs harbor collective justice 
goals that extend beyond legal system realities, such as affecting change 
throughout an industry, or a vindication of right against wrong.  But 
unlike plaintiffs in individual cases, named plaintiffs are satisfied 
because they believe the class action achieved those extra-legal goals. 
C. Perceptions of Process Fairness 
The data gleaned from interviews in this study strongly suggest that 
both named plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ lawyers evaluate the fairness of the 
consumer class action process according to the result in the case.  These 
findings contradict much of the literature on procedural justice and 
process control, while supporting the distributive justice theory. 
 
 177. Id. at 702. 
 178. See Relis, It’s Not About the Money!, supra note 4. 
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1. Named Plaintiffs’ Perceptions of Fairness 
Among the named plaintiffs who felt the process was fair (which 
constituted the overwhelming bulk of the interviewees), the most 
frequently cited reason was the favorable result in the case.  The 
following responses to an open-ended question about process fairness 
are illustrative179: 
Oh yeah, I think [the process was fair].  At least we got something.180 
It was fair.  Because I had my car fixed.181 
I think it was as fair as it could be.  [The defendant is] a limited 
liability corporation.  I would like to have seen more . . . but . . . given 
that it was a limited liability organization and certain judgments could 
have put them [into bankruptcy], then we would have gotten 
nothing.182 
The other most common reason cited by named plaintiffs for the 
perceived fairness of the process was the competence of their attorney, 
though this was typically a result-oriented response.  In other words, the 
named plaintiffs felt the process was fair because their lawyer produced 
a favorable result, either for the named plaintiff personally or the class as 
a whole: 
Yes [the litigation process was fair].  My lawyer got me the things for 
me that I wanted to get out of the lawsuit.183 
It was fair because of the way the lawyers handled it.184 
Yes [the litigation process was fair].  Because the other side tried 
everything, but the judge saw how the public was being taken 
advantage of.  There were a lot of appeals.  But I guess our attorneys 
were a lot smarter.185 
The latter comment is instructive for two reasons besides the link 
between plaintiffs’ attorneys and their client’s perception of process 
 
 179. The interview question was as follows: “Leaving aside the actual result of the class action, 
do you feel that the litigation process itself was fair in your class action?  Why or why not?” 
 180. Interview 30041, supra note 105. 
 181. Interview 30037, supra note 75. 
 182. Interview 30026 supra note89 (class action against condominium developer for ordinance 
violations). 
 183. Interview 30025 (Apr. 1, 2009) (class action against automobile dealership for 
overcharging registration fees). 
 184. Interview 30033, supra note 78. 
 185. Interview 30028, supra note 78. 
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fairness.  First, it illustrates the perception that fairness of process 
depends on the judge in the case.  As we will see shortly, this view is 
especially prevalent among attorneys, though far less so among named 
plaintiffs, who rarely encounter the judge during a class action.  Second, 
it reveals the same perception of class action as struggle between right 
and wrong that emerged in response to the questions about goals and 
satisfaction with the result in the case.  In this instance, the named 
plaintiff perceived the process as fair, in part, because the judge 
understood the larger issues at stake (the defendant’s exploitation of the 
public generally, rather than merely the other class members) and was 
not distracted by the defendant’s diversionary tactics.  According to this 
view, the judge is not merely an adjudicator of the dispute between the 
class and the defendant; rather, he or she decides more fundamental 
issues of collective justice in the face of corporate excess. 
Even the two named plaintiffs who were dissatisfied with the result 
in their case (because the class was not certified) nevertheless thought 
the process was fair because it provided an opportunity for “the little 
guy” to stand up to large corporations: 
Yeah, I thought the process was great and interesting.  Of course, I 
would change how it all came out, but I thought that the process was 
good.  I don’t think anything is wrong with class actions.  I think the 
only way that citizens can even stand up to corporations is through 
class actions.186 
[I]t seemed [that it was] as fair as it’s going to be for a little schmuck   
. . . . I think [the court is] made for the guys that got the power and the 
money, [rather] than . . . the little guys [who] come in and bang their 
toes.  I didn’t feel shut out and I feel that we would have got a fair 
shake and we did get a fair shake as far as we went, as fair as we could 
expect.187 
These comments are intriguing for a number of reasons.  Although 
the interview question sought the named plaintiffs’ opinion as to their 
particular class action, both chose to discuss the U.S. legal system 
generally.  And they both suggested (the first more obviously than the 
second) that the class action is the only exception to that system’s bias in 
favor of moneyed interests over the individual.  So here again, even 
among named plaintiffs disappointed with the result in their case, we see 
an appreciation—even an adulation in some cases—for the class action 
 
 186. Interview 30042, supra note 90. 
 187. Interview 30043, supra note 84. 
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as defender of the moral authority of individual interests against those of 
corporations. 
Only two named plaintiffs referenced actual litigation procedure in 
response to the question about fairness of the process.  One made a 
positive reference to “the formation of the class,”188 and another 
complained about a change in venue adversely affecting the case.189  The 
paucity of responses about actual procedure is not surprising, given how 
little contact most named plaintiffs had with the actual workings of the 
case.  In fact, one named plaintiff cited his detachment from the case as a 
basis for his perception that the process was fair: 
Sure [the process was fair]; I never had to go to court or anything.  I 
guess it was settled out of court.  I know I never had to go.  As far as I 
know if they went to court it was just the lawyers and the judge, I 
guess.  I didn’t have to do much of anything really.  I just sat at home 
and waited for them to call me or send me something or whatever.190 
The named plaintiffs’ limited role in class actions presents an 
alternative explanation for why most named plaintiffs equate fairness of 
process with result:  they have no other basis for evaluating fairness.  
Indeed, one named plaintiff never said whether she thought the process 
was fair.  Instead, she stated that she never went to court, implying that 
she never saw actual court procedures and thus could not evaluate their 
fairness.191 
To the extent that named plaintiffs felt the process was unfair, the 
most commonly stated reason was that it took too long.  But any such 
 
 188. Interview 1017, supra note 84. 
 189. Interview 30040, supra note 89. 
 190. Interview 30036, supra note 77.  The lawyers were also very aware of the limited role for 
named plaintiffs in most class actions, though they did not cite it as a reason for why the process 
was fair.  The following comments are illustrative: 
There are all sorts of legal issues that come out of [class actions] that really have very 
little to do with the main plaintiffs.  So, for example is this a certifiable class?  I mean 
some part of that involves the [named] plaintiff’s understanding but that’s like a tiny part 
of it.  Really what most of the fight is about is whether legally the kind of claim is one 
that should be determined on a class basis . . . . In . . . an individual case you’re just 
situated in a place that’s closer to that individual.  In a class action . . . you get more 
removed from that individual in a particular case and in fact, you’re supposed to be 
somewhat removed from that.  I don’t see that as a deficiency.  It’s just the nature of the 
proceeding. 
Interview 1016, supra note 115.  “The class litigation has its own timeline.  It has nothing to do with 
the individual [named plaintiff].  For instance, the motion and memorandum in support of the class 
certification usually has nothing to do with the individual.”  Interview 30044, supra note 29 (class 
action challenging a standard form debt collection letter). 
 191. Interview 30035, supra note 82. 
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negative feelings were outweighed by their satisfaction with the overall 
result in the case: 
It took a little longer than I thought.  That was the only thing I thought 
was unfair about it.192 
It’s onerous.  It’s long.  Overall with the result, yeah, I’m satisfied with 
it but it’s a long drawn out process.193 
The named plaintiffs’ responses to the fairness question were 
noticeably less overlapping and complex than their responses about 
goals and satisfaction.  The mean number of reasons cited for fairness 
(or lack thereof) was 1.3 (as compared to 2.3 goals and 1.9 reasons for 
satisfaction) and both the median and mode for the number of those 
responses was 1 (as opposed to 2 for both goals and satisfaction).  The 
more limited range of responses to the question about fairness attests to 
the predominance of case result as the basis for the named plaintiffs’ 
evaluation of fairness. 
On the surface then, the responses of most of the named plaintiffs 
were consistent with the distributive justice theory, which posits that 
disputants view the fairness of an adjudicative procedure in terms of the 
distribution of rights or resources flowing from it.194  Similarly, these 
responses also call into question the idea posited in the procedural 
justice literature that participants in adjudicative processes view the 
fairness of that process as separate and distinct from their interest in 
achieving a favorable outcome.  To the contrary, most of the named 
plaintiffs in this study view process and favorable outcome as one and 
the same; i.e., the process is fair because it leads to a favorable result.195  
Rather than believing that fair processes produce fair results, named 
plaintiff believe that successful results and fair procedures are 
synonymous. 
The close correlation between result and perceptions of fairness 
revealed in this study also calls into question the applicability of the 
process control theory in the class action context.  The central tenet of 
that theory holds that disputants evaluate the fairness of a given process 
by the extent to which it allows them to control the development and 
 
 192. Interview 30039, supra note 76. 
 193. Interview 30038, supra note 78. 
 194. See Shestowsky & Brett, supra note 14, at 90-91. 
 195. Because few named plaintiffs expressed dissatisfaction with the results of the case, it is 
difficult based on this study to determine the extent to which dissatisfied named plaintiffs similarly 
conflate fairness and result.  Nevertheless, as noted above, the two named plaintiffs who expressed 
dissatisfaction with the result felt that the process was fair. 
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selection of information that will be used to resolve the dispute.196  As a 
general matter, named plaintiffs have far less control over the 
information and other factors relevant to the resolution of a class action 
than do plaintiffs in individual cases.  As we saw earlier in this article, 
many of the named plaintiffs, as well as many lawyers, were keenly 
aware of this lack of control over (and involvement in) the process.  
Indeed, even the manner in which some named plaintiffs characterized 
the positive result of the case further illustrates the detachment they felt, 
even though they served as class representative: 
They won a huge settlement.197 
They won.  And I got more money than I’d thought.198 
It is not entirely clear whether the “they” to which these named 
plaintiffs are referring is their lawyer or the rest of the class, but in either 
case the term connotes a sense of distance between the named plaintiffs 
and the result in the case.  Thus, if many named plaintiffs feel removed 
from the kind of control that typically leads to satisfaction with a 
disputing process, why did the overwhelming number of named 
plaintiffs in this study nevertheless feel that the litigation process in their 
class action was fair?  As noted above, this was no doubt due in part to 
the conflation of result and perceptions of fairness.  Moreover, as Alan 
Erbsen suggests, given the choice between some control (i.e., less than 
they would experience as a plaintiff in an individual lawsuit) and no 
control whatsoever (i.e., as an absent class member), named plaintiffs 
are content with the former.199  This  contentment may be enhanced by 
the relatively low cost of serving as a named plaintiff, combined with the 
satisfaction that flows from being involved in a case that benefits a large 
number of persons and, perhaps, society generally. 
2. Plaintiffs’ Lawyers’ Perceptions of Fairness 
Most of the lawyers in this study took a similarly result-oriented 
view towards the notion of process fairness.  A few made the connection 
explicitly: 
Yeah, I think it was fair.  We weren’t happy when the judge dismissed 
the case at the front end.  We thought that he wasn’t making the right 
 
 196. See Thibault& Walker, supra note 5, at 1285-86. 
 197. Interview 1017, supra note 84 (emphasis added). 
 198. Interview 30038, supra note 78 (emphasis added). 
 199. See Erbsen, supra note 1, at 1008 n.17. 
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decision, which is why we appealed.  Ultimately, the litigation process 
worked the way it should; we won on appeal.  The case was resolved 
in a way that was favorable to our client.200 
I thought it was fair . . . . [T]he . . . judge that was assigned to the case 
was very conscientious, and stayed on top of the case, and knew what 
it was about, and took a very active interest in the case.  I suppose my 
view is always colored by the fact that . . . we got a decent settlement 
and a good result.201 
As to this case in particular, there was nothing that was unfair.  To the 
extent that anything was actually litigated, it was handled 
expeditiously and turned out well.202 
I thought we did well.  I thought the judge was OK.  We got the right 
rulings.203 
The vast majority of lawyers answered the fairness question by 
referring to the judge, but it was clear that a fair judge in their eyes was 
one who ruled in favor of the class.  As one lawyer put it, “The best facts 
don’t mean anything if you have a hostile judge.”204  Thus, the lawyers’ 
responses included observations that the judge liked the case, was 
sympathetic to the cause, was open to considering the plaintiff’s claims, 
wanted justice to prevail, paid attention to the case, read the papers, took 
the case seriously, and was knowledgeable and hard-working. 
Only three lawyers discussed procedural issues in response to this 
question:  two said that the process was fair because both sides were able 
to state their case or receive the discovery they desired;205 one 
complained that there was insufficient time for discovery.206  This lack 
of focus on procedure is noteworthy because, unlike the named plaintiffs 
who made similarly few such comments, the lawyers were engaged with 
the case on a regular and often intense basis.  Nevertheless, nearly all of 
the lawyers evaluated the fairness of the process according to its 
outcome, rather than the procedural workings of the case. 
 
 200. Interview 30046, supra note 124. 
 201. Interview 1012, supra note 131. 
 202. Interview 1003, supra note 111 (class action against manufacturer of over-the-counter 
cold remedy). 
 203. Interview 30017, supra note 123. 
 204. Interview 30020, supra note 110. 
 205. Telephone Interview 30022 (Mar. 9, 2009) (class action against health insurance company 
for denial of claims); Interview 1009, supra note 138. 
 
 206. Interview 1011, supra note 116. 
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The fairness responses of the lawyers also mirrored the named 
plaintiffs’ in that several criticized unwarranted delays, although they 
felt the process was nevertheless fair.207  Another notable way in which 
the lawyers’ perception of fairness mirrored that of many named 
plaintiffs was the sense that the consumer class action is a battle between 
right and wrong, and that the litigation process was fair because it 
permitted the “right” side to prevail: 
Yes [it was fair]. No one was cheated. . . . [The defendant] did what 
they should have done under the law. They admitted that they were in 
error. Their depositions all admitted the same thing. And [the case] 
accomplished a major, major social benefit.208 
I think it was [fair] and I think we’ve made good law in the process, 
not only for the employees of this company but we forced a lot of the 
big companies to be prudent just because these cases have been settling 
for a lot of money.209 
The latter comment is also noteworthy because it ties fairness into 
affecting the marketplace generally, not simply the conduct of the 
defendant in a particular class action.  This view is consistent with that 
of several named plaintiffs who saw their case as an opportunity to 
change the behavior of companies throughout a particular industry.  
These comments also reflect a more general confidence in the class 
action as the only way to reign in corporate excesses.  Other attorneys 
sounded the same theme: 
I am very proud to be a class action attorney.  It’s a powerful tool. I 
know they are the only effective way to enforce the laws to protect my 
clients.  I will make sure that it is not abused.  It is a remarkably 
effective, efficient fair way the private bar is far more effective, when 
they are given the proper tools.210 
 
 207. Interview 30017, supra note 123; Interview 1014, supra note 141; Interview 30018 (class 
action against health insurance company for unlawful increase in premiums) (Oct. 26, 2008); 
Interview 30014, supra note 61 (class action against insurance company for underwriting practices); 
Interview 1009, supra note 138. 
 208. Interview 30047, supra note 62 (class action against home appliance manufacturer for 
defective product).  Interestingly, the named plaintiff in this case harbored no such altruistic visions 
of the case and its outcome: “I just wanted my $100 back. I never thought about anyone else.”; 
Interview 30036, supra note 77. 
 209. Telephone Interview 30048 (July 30, 2009) (class action against trustees of employee 
benefit plan for breach of fiduciary duty). 
 210. Interview 30015, in Portland, Or. (Oct. 25, 2008) (class action against automobile credit 
company for discriminatory credit policies). 
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You see there are [two] types of controls for market misbehavior . . . . 
One is regulatory, two is supply and demand, you know that so and so 
is a thief if he doesn’t give you what he promises so people don’t go to 
him.  But as you know, neither of them is sufficient by itself.  Every 
one of the federal agencies that I’m aware of has said expressly in so 
many words and repeatedly . . . that they simply don’t have enough 
resources to do their job completely.  It is very true.  So, there is a very 
important function in relying upon private attorneys general.211 
This shared sense that a class action is a battle between forces of 
right and wrong is another example of the way in which, despite the 
lesser quantity of lawyer-client communication in class actions (as 
compared to individual cases), the quality of that communication may be 
more effective, as lawyers and clients mutually reinforce the idea that 
the lawsuit is about more than individual financial recovery.  It also 
demonstrates that whereas communication between lawyers and clients 
in individual cases continually narrows both lawyer and client goals as 
time progresses, lawyer-client communication continues to emphasize 
broader causes. 
On the other hand, at least a few attorneys are cynical about the 
potential of class actions—and litigation in general—to bring about any 
kind of meaningful social change: 
The whole court system is way too slow.  I think in the context of 
litigation I thought we did well. I thought the judge was OK.  We got 
the right rulings.  But you have to invest a lot of time and money to go 
after these people and in the end I’m not quite sure what you 
accomplish except to swat at one in an hundred thousand flies out 
there.212 
I certainly don’t think much of the judicial system or the process . . . . I 
can’t really complain because, you know, I’m making a living from it 
and it’s interesting and I feel like we are doing stuff that’s worth while 
but you know, it’s pretty much just throwing sand against the tide.213 
3. Plaintiffs’ Lawyers’ Views of Named Plaintiffs’ Perceptions of 
Fairness 
While most of the lawyers were willing to speculate as to their 
client’s goals and level of satisfaction with the result of the case, fewer 
were willing to opine about their client’s view of the fairness of the class 
 
 211. Interview 30022, supra note 205. 
 212. Interview 30017, supra note 123. 
 213. Interview 1007, supra note 109. 
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action process.  Many assumed that their clients thought it was fair, but 
offered no reason to support that assumption.  Perhaps this is because it 
is more difficult to project an assessment of fairness onto another than it 
is to assume that they are satisfied with the result of a lawsuit.  
Nevertheless, among those willing to offer an opinion (about half of the 
lawyers), the majority speculated that the named plaintiffs thought it was 
fair because of the result in the case.  Interestingly, a larger number of 
lawyers answered this question in a negative fashion than was the case 
with respect to their speculation about client satisfaction with the result.  
Four lawyers said that the named plaintiff felt that the case took too 
long.214  One speculated that the client may have felt it was unfair 
because she did not receive the injunctive relief sought.215  Two 
suggested that the named plaintiffs would say that at least one part of the 
process was unfair:  their deposition.216  As one of these lawyers, whose 
class action involved several named plaintiffs suing a credit card 
company for abusive debt collection practices, noted: 
I think some of them anyway, I know, did not think that the deposition 
process was fair.  They felt it was terrible and unfair for them to be 
deposed for a full day and questioned in a way that they felt was 
abusive . . . . They thought that they were being asked questions that 
had nothing to do with the case.  They thought that they were being 
asked questions that they couldn’t possibly have remembered.  And 
about things they couldn’t possibly have remembered. Or questions 
that suggested that they weren’t telling the truth.  That they were at 
fault when they didn’t feel that they were at fault.217 
In contrast, none of the named plaintiffs (including the named 
plaintiff represented by the lawyer who made the statement above) cited 
their deposition as contributing to their assessment of the fairness of the 
process.  Although one named plaintiff did complain about her 
deposition, she saw that as separate from her overall evaluation of 
process fairness.218 
 
 214. Interview 1005, supra note 143; Interview 1015, supra note 121; Interview 30044, supra 
note 29. 
 215. Interview 30023, supra note 115. 
 216. Interview 1002, supra note 111; Interview 30012, supra note 114. 
 217. Interview 30012, supra note 114. 
 218. Interview 1018, supra note 74. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
This study suggests that several central tenets of the dispute 
transformation and procedural justice literature either do not apply or 
should be modified in the class action context.  For example, while the 
plaintiffs’ lawyers in this study conditioned named plaintiffs on “legal 
system realities,” the reality they projected to their clients was an 
expanded view of remedies, rather than the narrow, money-based vision 
that lawyers in individual cases typically present to their clients.219 To 
the extent that the named plaintiffs were unaware of either the 
widespread effect of the harm they had suffered individually, or of the 
potential for class actions to provide large-scale non-monetary relief, the 
attorneys transformed their dispute, though in a very different way than 
lawyers in individual cases.  Rather than suppressing their clients’ “aims 
of principle,” these lawyers consciously and transparently cultivated and 
encouraged such aims. 
The lawyers’ underlying motivation for this transformation is the 
same as in individual cases:  to maximize the chances of a successful 
result.  Named plaintiffs who lack a broad vision of what the class action 
can offer, or who tire of litigation delays, are more likely to be tempted 
by individual settlement offers that can derail an otherwise meritorious 
class action.  Yet the effect of the transformation is very different:  the 
named plaintiffs who undergo it exhibit a more hopeful view of the legal 
system than most individual plaintiffs.  Thus, while Felstiner and Sarat 
found that many plaintiffs in materially successful individual cases are 
nevertheless disappointed with the legal system because their “extra-
legal” goals remain unfulfilled, nearly all of the named plaintiffs in this 
study—including those whose cases ended unsuccessfully—expressed 
satisfaction with the litigation process itself. 
This distinction is likely attributable to several factors.  The broader 
relief attainable through class actions is more likely to satisfy the non-
monetary goals of many named plaintiffs.  Indeed, many named 
plaintiffs see the class action as a vehicle for attaining “extra-legal” 
remedies, such as changes in corporate behavior throughout a particular 
industry.  Moreover, class actions appeal to named plaintiffs’ conception 
of right versus wrong, allowing them to interpret a successful result as 
more than a monetary payout, but rather a moral victory, a triumph for 
“the little guy” over corporate excess.  And while there were too few 
materially unsuccessful cases in this study to say for sure, one suspects 
 
 219. See Relis, It’s Not About the Money!, supra note 4. 
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that even in such cases, named plaintiffs nevertheless feel a sense of 
pride in having taken a stand against a corporation that was, in their 
view, abusing many people.  Further, as Garth’s earlier study on class 
actions suggests, the role of named plaintiff itself provides a sense of 
importance and empowerment, transcending the material result in the 
case.220 
In a related vein, the data collected for this study reveal no 
correlation between the level of named plaintiff involvement in the 
litigation and their sense of empowerment.  While nearly all of the 
named plaintiffs had little engagement with, or control over, the case 
that bore their name, many nevertheless felt a significant level of 
personal satisfaction and pride with the result.  Indeed, in an ironic twist, 
it was one of the few activist named plaintiffs, whom one would expect 
to be most involved in the case and thus empowered by the successful 
result, who stated that “They [i.e., not “We”] won a huge settlement.”221  
In addition, one of the named plaintiffs who felt most encouraged and 
empowered by the result, feeling that her efforts resulted in a change in 
industry practices, reported that she never had to go to court, didn’t have 
much communication with her attorney, and “the lawyers handled 
things.”222  Thus, at least in consumer class actions (a sub-group not 
covered in Garth’s study) named plaintiff satisfaction and empowerment 
seem to have little to do with extent of involvement and control.  The 
relief obtained, and the scope of that result, seem to be far more 
important contributors to these positive reactions to the experience of 
being a named plaintiff.  In this way, many named plaintiffs in consumer 
class actions resemble those potential claimants who rejected payments 
from the 9/11 Victims Compensation Fund, to whom “litigation 
represents more . . . than a means to satisfying private material ends; it 
represents principled participation in a process that is constitutive of a 
community.”223 
The paramount importance of the result in the eyes of named 
plaintiffs also contradicts the central tenet of the process control theory, 
which holds that disputants evaluate a given dispute resolution 
procedure according to the amount of control it affords them over the 
development and selection of information used to resolve the dispute.224  
The interviews of named plaintiffs and lawyers alike reveal that the 
 
 220. See supra note 2. 
 221. Interview 1017, supra note 84. 
 222. Interview 30035, supra note 82. 
 223. See Hadfield, supra note 63, at 649. 
 224. Shestowsky& Brett, supra note 14, at 68. 
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former have far less control over the development and selection of 
information used to resolve the dispute than plaintiffs in individual 
cases.  Nevertheless, these same named plaintiffs expressed far more 
satisfaction with the fairness of the process than has been reported in 
studies of plaintiffs in individual cases. 
Moreover, the findings of this study contrast with those analyzing 
individual cases across a variety of substantive areas that perceptions of 
fairness depend as much, if not more, on process characteristics than on 
whether disputants “won” the dispute.  On the contrary, perceptions of 
fairness among the named plaintiffs in this study were overwhelmingly 
linked to the result of the case, at least when that case ended 
successfully.  Because the number of named plaintiffs interviewed about 
unsuccessful cases was too small, it is impossible to speculate as to 
whether this pattern holds true when the plaintiffs lose. 
In another departure from the findings in some of the literature on 
disputing behavior, the lawyers in this study were generally attuned to 
their clients’ complex and overlapping array of goals.  They also 
recognized that those goals sometimes became more oriented toward 
collective justice as the case endured.  This contrasts with, for example, 
Relis’ finding that plaintiffs’ lawyers in medical malpractice cases tend 
to view their clients’ goals as remaining consistent (and primarily 
centered on money) throughout the course of the lawsuit.225  Of course, 
this heightened awareness of named plaintiffs’ goals among class action 
lawyers is largely the result of the way in which the lawyers encourage 
and nurture those very goals. 
Ultimately, this study suggests that named plaintiffs are no different 
from individual plaintiffs in at least one key respect:  they want justice 
done.  They want an accounting for the defendant’s behavior and see 
litigation as the necessary means to that end.  And they are happy to 
allow their lawyers to seek that accounting.  What distinguishes the 
litigation experience for most named plaintiffs, however, is that they are 
encouraged by their lawyers to maintain and expand these justice-
seeking goals, rather than narrow them.  As a result, they are likely to 
have a more favorable view of the litigation process, and of lawyers, 
than individual plaintiffs, regardless of the outcome of the case. 
 
 225. See Relis, It’s Not About the Money!, supra note 4. 
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APPENDIX A—QUESTIONS FOR ATTORNEYS 
1.  Please provide a brief overview of a class action that is now 
closed in which you represented a class of plaintiffs.  In your answer, 
please include: 
 
The name of the case; 
 
The approximate size of the class; 
 
The duration of the lawsuit, from filing to resolution. 
 
2.  As plaintiffs’ counsel in this case, what were your goals when 
you filed this lawsuit? 
 
3.  On a scale of 1-10, with 1 being attorneys’ fees and 10 being the 
desire for some kind of larger social good, where would you place your 
motivation for filing this lawsuit? 
 
4.  Did your goals change during the course of this lawsuit? 
 
5.  Please give a brief summary of the facts and legal claims in this 
lawsuit (if not already provided in response to an earlier question). 
 
6.  Please describe the nature of the relief sought in this lawsuit (if 
not already provided in response to an earlier question). 
 
7.  Why do you think the named plaintiff(s) filed this lawsuit? 
 
8.  Did the named plaintiff(s)’ reasons for filing this lawsuit change 
during the course of the lawsuit?  If so, why? 
 
9.  Did you ever sense that your goals in litigating this lawsuit 
differed from your clients’ goals?  And if so, what—if anything—did 
you do about that? 
 
10.  How frequently did you discuss this lawsuit with the named 
plaintiffs while the case was ongoing?  In general, how would you 
describe the substance of those conversations? 
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11.  What was the result of this lawsuit, and were you satisfied with 
that result?  Why or why not? 
 
12.  Leaving aside the actual result of this lawsuit, do you feel that 
the litigation process itself was fair in this lawsuit?  Why or why not? 
 
13.  Do you think the class representative(s) in this lawsuit were 
satisfied with the result of the lawsuit?  Why or why not? 
 
14.  Leaving aside the actual result of this lawsuit, do you think that 
the named plaintiffs felt that the litigation process itself was fair in this 
lawsuit?  Why or why not? 
 
15.  As a general matter, how do you decide whether a potential 
named plaintiff in a class action would be a suitable class representative? 
 
16.  As a general matter, during the course of a lawsuit, do you 
speak more frequently, less frequently, or the same amount with your 
clients in class actions or individual cases?  Why do you think this is so? 
 
17.  If you could change the class action procedure in any way, 
what, if anything would you change? 
 
Ask for contact information from named plaintiffs. 
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APPENDIX B—QUESTIONS FOR NAMED PLAINTIFFS 
1.  Please provide a brief overview of the class action entitled 
[NAME OF CLASS ACTION DISCUSSED BY THEIR ATTORNEY 
IN PRIOR INTERVIEW] in which you served as a named plaintiff.  In 
your answer, please include: 
 
The approximate size of the class; 
 
The duration of the lawsuit, from filing to resolution. 
 
2.  What were your goals when you filed this lawsuit? 
 
3.  On a scale of 1-10, with 1 being a monetary award and 10 being 
the desire for some kind of larger social good, where would you place 
your motivation for filing this lawsuit? 
 
4.  Where would you place your lawyer on this spectrum? 
 
5.  Did your goals change during the course of this lawsuit?  If so, 
why do you think this happened? 
 
6.  Please give a brief summary of the facts and legal claims in this 
lawsuit (if not already provided in response to an earlier question). 
 
7.  Please describe the nature of the relief sought in this lawsuit (if 
not already provided in response to an earlier question). 
 
8.  Did you ever feel that your goals in pursuing this lawsuit 
differed from your lawyers’ goals?  And if so, what—if anything—did 
you do about that? 
 
9.  How frequently did you discuss this lawsuit with your lawyer 
while this lawsuit was ongoing?  In general, how would you describe the 
substance of those conversations? 
 
10.  What was the result of this lawsuit, and were you satisfied with 
that result?  Why or why not? 
 
11.  Leaving aside the actual result of the lawsuit, do you feel that 
the litigation process itself was fair in your lawsuit?  Why or why not? 
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12.  If you could change the class action procedure in any way, 
what, if anything would you change? 
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